Protesters, Extortion, and Coercion: Preventing RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms by Murray, Brian J.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 2 Article 6
12-1-1999
Protesters, Extortion, and Coercion: Preventing
RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms
Brian J. Murray
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation




PROTESTERS, EXTORTION, AND COERCION:
PREVENTING RICO FROM CHILLING FIRST
AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
Brian j Murray*
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive im-
pact... does not remove them from the reach of the First Amendment.1
[N]o one really knows a law thoroughly unless he knows what the courts
have made of it.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
In the tradition of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Americans who
disagree with the practices of others have a Constitutional right to
protest. Through such protest they can attempt, with zeal, to per-
suade those who engage in such practices to change their ways.
Under the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court such
protest activity does not fall outside of the protection of the First
Amendment "simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them
into action."
3
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2000; B.S., University of
Notre Dame, 1997.
1 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
2 MoRms R. COHEN, LAW AND T=m SocIA. ORDER 133 (1932).
3 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982); see also id- at 921
("To the extent that the [lower] court's judgment rests on the ground that 'many'
black citizens were 'intimidated' by 'threats' of 'social ostracism, vilification, and tra-
duction,' it is flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment.").
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Something is wrong, then, when the following story can take
place in America.
4
One day Joseph Scheidler (a former Benedictine monk and a fol-
lower of Dr. King) and three ministers entered an abortion clinic.
They went to the clinic to tell its administrator that they would be
demonstrating there the next day. Seeing that the administrator's sur-
name was Connor, and guessing that she was a Catholic, Scheidler
warned Connor, "Get out of the abortion business. Someday you will
have to answer to Almighty God, who has a commandment: 'Thou
shalt not kill."' 5 The next day, following the protest, Scheidler was
arrested, found guilty of second-degree trespass, not guilty of harass-
ment, and given a small fine, but commended by the judge for his
non-violent approach. Approximately one year later, Connor left her
job.
Around that time, another suit was filed against Scheidler. After
considerable litigation, including an appeal to the Supreme Court,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
claims in that suit reached a jury, which found that Scheidler's con-
4 This story is told in Hearings on the Civil RICO Clarification Act of 1990 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1-2 (1998) (state-
ment of G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School) (visited Nov. 5,
1999) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/35051.htm> [hereinafter Clarification Hear-
ings]. Professor Blakey represented defendantJoseph Scheidler before the Supreme
Court in NOWv. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); consequently, this story is told from
Scheidler's perspective. Another version is told by Fay Clayton, counsel for plaintiff
National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW), in that case. See Fay Clayton, NOW
v. Scheidler: Protecting Women's Access to Reproductive Health Services, 62 ALB. L. REV. 967,
978 (1999). According to Clayton,
In April 1986, shortly after several clinics had been bombed, Scheidler and
three other large, burly [Pro-Life Action Network] activists paid a visit on [a
clinic]. The clinic administrator-a petite, young woman-was there alone,
and the intruders positioned themselves in such a way that they prevented
her escape. She asked them to leave, but they refused. One of these men
reached over the reception desk, commandeered the telephones and put
them on hold, effectively cutting the clinic administrator off from the
outside world. Once they had her trapped, they warned her that they were
there to "case the place," to make "Delaware ... the first abortion-free state
in the nation," and that she had better leave her job.
Id. (citing Direct Examination of Cathy K. Conner at 1153-54, Scheidler (No. 86-C-
7888)) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 982 (describing the above as an "invasion"
involving "outright thuggery," in which "Scheidler and his colleagues terrorized [Con-
nor] ... and ultimately caused her to resign"). The trial transcript does not bear out
Clayton's version. See Direct Examination of Cathy K. Conner at 1153-54, Scheidler
(No. 86--7888); Cross Examination of Cathy K. Conner by Deborah M. Fischer at
1165-71, Scheidler (No. 86-G-7888).
5 Clarification Hearings, supra note 4, at 1.
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duct constituted extortion under the Hobbs Act.6 The jury therefore
found him liable under RICO 7 and returned a civil verdict against
him and two others for $85,926.8 The damages awarded were for the
increased security costs at the two abortion clinics that flowed from
anti-abortion demonstrations. The jury, however, was not required in
its deliberation to make detailed findings of which individuals com-
mitted the various acts involved in the protest, despite urging from
defendant's counsel.9 Nor was it instructed to differentiate the in-
creased security costs attributable to lawful conduct by Scheidler, as
opposed to unlawful conduct by Scheidler or others wholly unrelated
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994); see also infra note 84 and accompanying text.
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961-64 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also infra notes 35-48 and
accompanying text.
8 See Abortion Foes Say They Can't Pay, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1998, atA7 (discussing
the jury verdict in NOW v. Scheidler).
9 See Trial Transcript at 4495, Scheidler (No. 86-C-7888). Counsel for defendant
Joseph Scheidler urged the trial court as follows:
MR. BREJCHA: Your Honor, for the record.., we would believe and
urge that the plaintiff should list in the special interrogatories each particu-
lar incident they allege to constitute an act of force, threat, or violence suffi-
cient to be extortion.
THE COURT: Absolutely not. Absolutely not.
MR. BREJCHA. I heard absolutely not. I simply for the record will make
the point ....
Id. Counsel later reiterated the point, but was no more successful.
MR. BREJCHA [The decision] could still be reviewed [without the jury
making particularized findings of liability],Judge. We concede that. It'sjust
that the burden being on the plaintiffs to make a clear record as to what is
the pattern. We don't know-even if we categorize, which is now proposed
as an additional level of specificity, we still don't know which particular pred-
icate acts within those given abstract categories would be found by the jury to
constitute [RICO predicate acts giving rise to liability].
THE COURT: I think I can safely say all of the [acts].
MR. BREJCHA. Without knowing which particular incidents constituted
predicate acts as found by thejury, we won't know, of course, where there's a
pattern because we don't know which particular demonstrations-I will
grant you, Your Honor, I think it would be a-just an onslaught of specificity
to find one phrase. But I think that's the nature of the case that's been
brought that attacks an entire protest movement over 15 years as a "pattern"
of particular acts of extortion or whatever. But I think that without having
that specificity, how could you tell.
THE COURT: Okay. I will refuse that.
Id. at 4497-98.
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to Scheidler. Instead, in a series of "Special Interrogatories," the jury
made only generic findings of liability for all conduct involved in the
fifteen-year long series of protest activities and returned a lump sum
for each plaintiff.10 The defendants will owe nearly $260,000 when the
damages are trebled under RICO." More troubling, though, is that
they have already had to pay for discovery and for their own attorneys
for the lengthy litigation. And, if they ultimately lose, under RICO the
protesters will also have to pay both their opponents' costs and their
attorney fees-which currently exceed one million dollars.12
Even if this verdict ultimately is reversed on appeal, the message
that this extended litigation sends is unequivocal. The line between
protected and unprotected protest is vague, and once the line is
crossed, at least under the rationale of Scheidler, plaintiffs can recover
damages for all protest conduct by anyone involved in the protest any-
where-not just a defendant's own conduct that exceeds the scope of
First Amendment protection. Therefore, the only people who can af-
ford fully to exercise their right to protest are the wealthy, who can
afford litigation, and the poor, who are judgment-proof anyway.
Others, fearful of the costs of this sort of litigation-even if they ulti-
mately "win"-will be intimidated into limiting the exercise of their
rights to some level far below that to which they are entitled under the
First Amendment for fear of crossing the murky line from protest to
trespass. 13 Clearly, then, the prospect of this kind of litigation threat-
10 See generally Special Interrogatories and Verdict Form, Scheidler (No. 86-C-
7888).
11 See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 24 n.10, Scheidler (No. 86-C-7888)
("18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides that any civil plaintiff shall recover treble damages and
a reasonable attorney's fee. Therefore, the monetary damages awarded to [the two
corporate plaintiffs] . . . are trebled to $163,413.84 and $94,366.92, respectively.").
12 See Abdon M. Pallasch & Judy Peres, Abortion Foes Suffer Big Setback, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 21, 1998, at 1.
13 Curiously, one of the groups that should be most concerned about this kind of
application of RICO and the Hobbs Act is NOW, the plaintiffs in Scheidler. As their
counsel observed,
As an advocacy organization itself, NOW is keenly aware of the role that
speech plays in our nation's culture .... NOW relies on First Amendment
liberties to advocate equality for women, and NOW has long supported the
numerous non-violent tools for making a message known [including]
[p]icketing, leafleting, and other forms of advocacy ....
Clayton, supra note 4, at 994. Nevertheless, NOW lawyers were the primary architects
of the RICO/Hobbs Act suit for use against political protesters. Edmund Tiryak,
counsel for plaintiff in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d
Cir. 1989), outlined the origin of the strategy in a speech to a NOW convention in
Philadelphia in 1987. Tiryak began by sharing his belief that "right-to-lifer[s]" are "a
bunch of drooling androids." Address of E. Tiryak, Counsel to Northeast Women's
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ens to undermine First Amendment rights and values. 14 Remedial ac-
tion is required.
This Note begins by examining RICO and its legislative history,
which reveals that RICO's drafters, in fact, took special care to make
sure that it would not be used to abridge civil liberties, particularly in
the context of political and social protest activity. It then traces the
evolution of extortion from its common law roots and identifies the
judicial steps that are transforming it from a powerful weapon to fight
racketeering of all kinds into an indiscriminate bludgeon of First
Amendment freedoms. Next the Note examines the First Amend-
ment implications of this evolution, including the ways in which it is
ignoring specific Supreme Court directives in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.15 on how courts should treat litigation implicating First
Amendment issues. It concludes by suggesting that judicial or legisla-
tive action is required to
(1) retrench the judicially expanded definition of "extortion,"
clarifying that extortionate "obtaining" requires both a "get-
ting" and a "deprivation" of tangible or intangible property;
(2) ensure that "precision of regulation" is used in litigation in-
volving First Amendment freedoms to distinguish protected
from unprotected activity and in assessing individual and
group liability; and
(3) clarify the concept of "threat."
Center, Inc., N.O.W. Convention (July 14, 1987), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, app. A at A-270, McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901
(1989) (No. 88-2137). He then went on to explain the genesis of the RICO/Hobbs
Act suit:
Two of my partners do criminal defense work and they were defending
somebody in a criminal RICO case. And they were coming back to the office
every day complaining saying that it was impossible to defend these cases
'cause the law's so oppressive.
So I went home that night and said, "you know, this would be a great
idea-have a Supreme Court have to decide whether they want to oppress
people more under RICO or they want to be more right-to-life. You know,
what a great prospect."
Id. at A-274 to A-275.
14 Clayton argues that these concerns are quite different from those addressed by
the defendants in Scheidler. According to her, "[t]hey argued essentially that if speech
is an element of their acts of brutality, the First Amendment immunizes those acts."
Clayton, supra note 4, at 993. Clayton's point, however, proves too much. Clearly
illegal acts are illegal whether or not they are combined with speech. Assessing liabil-
ity for unprotected acts on the basis of other, protected acts, however, is another
matter entirely. So, too, is holding one person liable for another's conduct.
15 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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II. RICO AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA),16 Title IX of which is RICO. 17 RICO had its genesis in the
work of the Kefauver Committee, the first of many national groups to
investigate the problem of organized crime in America following the
Attorney General's 1950 Conference on Organized Crime.18 RICO
was drafted to deal with "enterprise criminality";19 it was seen as a
novel approach to solving a novel problem. Congress felt that RICO
was necessary because "the sanctions and remedies available" for deal-
ing with enterprise criminality were "unnecessarily limited in scope
and impact."
20
16 Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-64 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Various authors have examined
the interplay between RICO and First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., G. Robert
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 237, 249, 256 (1982) (cited with approval in Rusello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 28 (1983), and Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1993)); Craig
M. Bradley, NOWv. Scheidler: RICO Meets the First Amendment, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 129;
AntonioJ. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 835 (1990); Geri
J. Yonover, Fighting Fire with Fire: Civil RICO and Anti-Abortion Activists, 12 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 153, 170 (1990); see alsoJohn P. Barry, Note, When Protesters Become "Racke-
teers," RICO Runs Afoul of the First Amendment, 64 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 899 (1990); Jen-
nifer Bullock, Note, National Organization for Women v. Scheidler: RICO and the
Economic Motive Requirement, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1533 (1994); Adam D. Gale, Note, The
Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion Protesters and the Economic Motive Requirement, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1341 (1990); Carole Golinski, Comment, In Protest of NOW v.
Scheidler, 46 ALA. L. REV. 163 (1994); Bryn K. Larsen, Note, RICO's Application to
Noneconomic Actors: A Serious Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 14 REV. LrriG. 707
(1995); Timothy S. Millman, Note, Civil RICO, Protesters, and the First Amendment: A
Constitutional Combination, 60 Mo. L. REV. 239 (1995); Steven E. Soule & Karen R.
Weinstein, Note, Racketeering Anti-Abortion Protesters, and the First Amendment, 4 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 365 (1994); Hao-Nhien Q. Vu, Note, A Response to Soule & Weinstein:
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler Is Just Hard Facts Making Bad Law, 4
UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 399 (1994); Joel A. Youngblood, Note, NOW v. Scheidler: The
First Amendment Falls Victim to RICO, 30 TULSA LJ. 195 (1994). For a full history of the
legislative process that spawned RICO, co-authored by the statute's drafter, see G.
Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and
Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1345, 1660 (1996) (app. H).
18 See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 17, at 1667.
19 See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (observing that
"enterprise criminality" consists of "all types of organized criminal behav-
ior... [ranging] from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar crime
schemes to traditional Mafia-type endeavors") (citing with approval G. Robert Blakey
& Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-
Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013-14 (1980)).
20 Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
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During the legislative process that produced RICO, several of the
bill's opponents objected to its breadth, especially the possibility that
RICO might be used against political protesters. Several objections
were raised in hearings on Senate Bill 1861, a forerunner of the final
statute, which defined racketeering activity as "any act involving the
danger of violence to life, limb or property, indictable under State or
Federal law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year."21 Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Philip A. Hart complained
that the bill reached beyond "organized crime."22 The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) also opposed the bill, expressing its concern
that social and political protesters might fall within the bill's ambit,
subjecting them to its draconian penalties. The ACLU found the
breadth of the original definition of racketeering activity "particularly
troublesome," citing the anti-war demonstrations at the Pentagon
23
and Columbia University.24 It feared, in short, that the statute would
21 S. 1861, 91st Cong. § 2(a) (1969); see also 115 CONG. REc. 9569 (1969).
22 See S. REP. No. 91-617, at 215 (1969) ("[T]he reach of this bill goes beyond
organized criminal activity.") (individual views of Sen. Philip A. Hart and Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy).
23 The ACLU pointed out that
[l]ast year's massive anti-war demonstration at the Pentagon resulted in a
number of arrests for acts involving the danger of violence to life, limb, or
property indictable under state or federal law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year .... [Olffenses of the kind which resulted from the
demonstrations in connection with the anti-war protest movement could fall within the
definition of pattern of racketeering activity of the bill ....
Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30 and Related Measures Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Laws and Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 91st Cong. 475
(1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Lawrence Speiser, director of the
Washington office of the ACLU) (emphasis added).
24 The ACLU testified that
[The protest at Columbia] was a group activity which resulted in arrests,
involved the danger of violence to property, and involved offenses for which
imprisonment for more than a year was possible. Under S. 1861, Mr. [James
Simon] Kunen [author of "Strawberry Statement," describing his participa-
tion in the campus disorders] could not lawfully invest the proceeds from his
book. Whatever one may think of the offenses or the offenders in these
hypotheticals, and questions of whether or not their activity is in any way protected
by constitutional guarantees aside, it is clear that this proposed legislation is in no way
intended to subject them to the penalties described. Nevertheless, there is absolutely
nothing in the bill to prevent them from being so used.
Id. at 476 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, director of the Washington office of the
ACLU) (emphasis added). This statement, and the statement in note 23, supra,
clearly demonstrate that the ACLU was determined not merely to exclude constitu-
tionally protected conduct, which could not in any event be reached, but to assure
that RICO was not used at all in the context of social or political demonstrations.
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be used by the Nixon Administration to suppress anti-war dissent.
The Department ofJustice, too, objected; it argued that the definition
of "racketeering activity" in the bill was "too broad and would result in
a large number of unintended applications."25 Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Richard G. Kleindienst suggested an amendment to narrow the
definition to a list of specific offenses "customarily invoked against or-
ganized crime.
'26
In response to these misgivings, the Senate Judiciary Committee
eliminated the broad language defining "racketeering activity" ("dan-
ger of violence to life, limb or property"). When incorporating Senate
Bill 1861 (which became Title IX of the OCCA, or RICO) into Senate
Bill 30 (which would become the OCCA), the Committee replaced
the initial broad language with a list of designated federal and state
offenses. The new language was virtually identical to that recom-
mended by the Justice Department. 27 The Senate passed the changed
bill by a vote of seventy-three to one.28 The House then made minor
amendments-with which the Senate concurred 29-and President
Richard M. Nixon signed the bill into law on October 15, 1970.50
With the narrowing of "racketeering activity," apparently no one
believed that RICO posed a threat to political protesters. Satisfied
25 Senate Report, supra note 22, at 121-22 (statement of Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Richard Kleindeinst).
26 Id. at 122; see also id. at 158.
27 Compare S. REP. No. 91-617, at 215 (1969), with Senate Hearings, supra note 23,
at 405. A piece by the statute's drafter, Professor G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel for
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee at the time that RICO was drafted, indicates that the resemblance is not coinci-
dental. Blakey has reported that RICO's chief sponsor, Senator John L. McClellan,
instructed him to "strike the language that gave the senators concern." Blakey asserts,
as a result of his doing just that,
[n] o offense relating to trespass or vandalism in the context of protests was
included [in the version of RICO which was ultimately enacted] .... The
offense of "extortion" ("obtaining property by fear") was included, but it was
modeled on the early English common law, which emphasized "obtaining"
property .... not "depriving" someone of property .... Pointedly, the
offense of. . . "coercion" ("forcing another to act against his or her will")
[was] excluded from the list of RICO offenses to preclude any possibility that
RICO might be used against demonstrators.
G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Racket, NAT'L R~v., May 16, 1994, at 62; see also Blakey &
Roddy, supra note 17, at 1665 ("The senators and congressmen who drafted RICO
knew the difference between 'extortion' and 'coercion.' Had they meant to include
'coercion,' they would have said it.").
28 See 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970).
29 See id, at 36,296.
30 See id at 37,264.
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that the amendment incorporated its proposed changes, the Justice
Department made no further comment on RICO's breadth or the
possibility of unintended application of the statute. Significantly,
although the ACLU continued to oppose Title X (sentencing) of the
OCCA, it noted the responsive changes in Tite IX (RICO) with plea-
sure, observing that "[t]he substantive provisions of [RICO] have
been substantially revised so as to eliminate most of the previously ob-
jectionable features."31 Leading Senators and House members also
united on the same point: the bill was narrowly drafted to avoid tread-
ing on civil liberties. Senator John L. McClellan, RICO's chief spon-
sor, informed his colleagues in the Senate that "[RICO] offers the first
major hope of beginning to eradicate the growing organized criminal
influence in legitimate commerce, while posing no real threat to civil
liberties."3 2 Representative Richard H. Poff, who sponsored the bill in
the House of Representatives, stated that RICO "does not violate the
civil liberties of those who are not engaged in organized crime, but
who nonetheless are within the incidental reach of provisions primar-
ily intended to affect organized crime."33 Senator Kennedy, too, ap-
parently believed that RICO would not reach political protest.3 4
As enacted, RICO makes unlawful the commission of four types
of activities. These include (i) investing income derived from a pat-
31 116 CONG. REc. 854 (1970) (ACLU statement put into the record by Sen.
Young).
32 1d at 18,941 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
33 1d at 35,344 (remarks of Rep. Poff).
34 Senator Kennedy's continued fears of misuse of the OCCA, even after the
amendment of Title IX, prompted him to argue against Tide X of the OCCA, a dan-
gerous special offender sentencing provision. Senator Kennedy expressed concern
that Title X could apply, not only to organized criminals, but to anyone who commit-
ted any significant federal crime. Specifically, he feared that Title X would apply to
someone like Dr. Benjamin Spock, a pediatrician who was tried and convicted for
violation of the Selective Service Act after staging sit-ins at armed services recruiting
centers, draft-card burnings, and other anti-war demonstrations. See 116 CONG. REc.
845, 845-46 (1970); see also United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 168 n.2 (1st Cir.
1969). To ensure that the sentencing provisions of Title X would not reach anti-war
demonstrators, Senator Kennedy proposed an amendment to limit Title X, substitut-
ing for "any felony" the list of offenses designated under Tide IX (RICO). See 116
CONG. REC. 845 (1969). Senator McClellan argued to the contrary. "It seems to me,"
Senator McClellan said, "that it would be a grave mistake to restrict dangerous of-
fender sentencing to any list of specified offenses supposedly typical of organized
crime." Id. at 845.
This exchange demonstrates that both Kennedy and McClellan understood that
RICO was narrower than "any felony," and in fact did not apply to political protest-
Kennedy believed, and McClellan accepted, that if Title X were limited to the offenses
contained in Tide IX, Dr. Spock would be excluded from Title X. Kennedy's amend-
ment ultimately failed. See id. at 849.
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tern of racketeering activity in the acquisition, establishment, or oper-
ation of any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce;3 5 (ii)
acquiring or maintaining any interest in an interstate enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity;3 6 (iii) participating in the
conduct of an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity;3 7 and (iv) conspiring to violate any of the above provisions.
38
"Racketeering activity," no longer "any act involving the danger of vio-
lence to life, limb, or property,"39 comprises various narrowly targeted
state and federal crimes,40 which are commonly referred to as "predi-
cate acts" or "predicate offenses."' 41 A "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" requires the commission of at least two "predicate acts,"42 which
must be both "related" and "continuous."43
RICO provides for both criminal4 and civil45 sanctions for viola-
tions. The criminal penalties for RICO violations are severe; they in-
clude fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture of assets derived from
racketeering activity.46 Moreover, under RICO's civil component,
"[a] ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994). Each of RICO's provisions can also be violated
through collection of an "illegal debt" without the requirement of a "pattern of racke-
teering activity." Id. This "illegal debt" collection element of the provisions, however,
is not relevant to the purposes of this Note, and therefore is not discussed.
36 See id § 1962(b).
37 See id § 1962(c).
38 See id § 1962(d).
39 S. 1861, 91st Cong. § 2(a) (1969); see also 115 CONG. REc. 9569 (1969).
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (a) (1994). The crimes that constitute "racketeering
activity... may... be grouped into four broad, but not mutually exclusive categories:
(1) violence; (2) provision of illegal goods and services; (3) corruption in the labor
movement or among public officials; and (4) commercial and other forms of fraud."
Blakey, supra note 17, at 302-06. Thus, "racketeering activity" includes such crimes as
murder, kidnapping, bribery, robbery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, wire
fraud, mail fraud, securities fraud, embezzlement, bribery, obstruction ofjustice and
numerous other state and federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1861(1)(a) (1994). This
extensive list of predicate offenses does not, however, include the offenses of "tres-
pass," "riot," or "vandalism" in the context of social or political protest, nor does it
include the offense of "coercion."
41 See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-66 n.9
(1992) (discussing the "predicate offenses" listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994)).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
43 See HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237-244 (1989); see
alsoJoseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy-Is This the End of RICO?"--Justice
Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern, " 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1106, 1108-10 (1990) (discussing "pattern").
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994).
45 See id. § 1964.
46 See id. § 1963(a).
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don of [RICO]" can bring suit against the violator.47 The potential
liability under a civil RICO claim is significant; victorious claimants in
such suits may recover treble damages, costs, and reasonable attor-
neys' fees.
48
Despite the narrowing of RICO in the legislative process to pre-
vent its use to abridge social or political protest activities, the statute is
beginning to be used successfully against political and social protes-
ters. Anti-abortion protesters have been the main targets of the suits
using RICO in this way.49 Yet, although some plaintiffs have charged
that anti-abortion demonstrators are involved in a violent national
conspiracy, the successful cases have not based the protesters' RICO
liability on proven allegations of violent crime.50 (In fact, after seeing
all of the evidence presented by the National Organization for Wo-
men (NOW), the district court in Scheidler specifically held on a mo-
tion for summary judgment that the evidence-supposediy
connecting Scheidler and his codefendants to murder or kidnap-
ping-was insufficient as a matter of law.) 51 Instead, extortion is the
predicate offense upon which the decisions predicate RICO liability
for these protesters.
For this reason, the offense of "extortion" merits closer examina-
tion. Both state and federal extortion are predicate offenses under
RICO.52 While the following analysis concentrates on the history of
47 Id. § 1964(c).
48 See id
49 Under the approach used in these cases, however, RICO could be used against
any group of social or political protesters-not just anti-abortion protesters. See infra
Part V.
50 Notably, none of the decisions have involved proven allegations of murder or
kidnapping (each a RICO predicate offense) against the demonstrators, although
murders and arsons have, in fact, occurred at abortion clinics throughout the nation.
To date, despite the best efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (A.T.F.) to establish a national conspiracy,
these acts have been shown to be the conduct of misguided individuals, not that of
any nation-wide conspiracy. See Letter from James L. Brown, Chief, Explosives Divi-
sion, Department of the Treasury, A.T.F., to Clarke Forsythe, Americans United for
Life 1 (Dec. 1, 1993) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review) ("There is no indication
that any particular group has acted in unison on the abortion clinic arsons and bomb-
ings. These incidents have been the work of single individuals or small, closed
groups.").
51 NOW v. Scheidler, No. 86-C-7888, 1997 WL 61078, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23,
1997) ("[P]laintiffi are noticeably strained in their attempt to implicate the defend-
ants in the attempted murder of Dr. George Tiller, and the murders of Dr. John
Britton and James Barrett.").
52 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. llI 1997).
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extortion under the Hobbs Act,53 it is equally applicable to state extor-
tion statutes: the proponents of the Hobbs Act, in fact, viewed its defi-
nition of extortion as representative of the extortion laws of the
various states.
54
III. THE EvoLUTION OF EXTORTION: FROM "ExToRTION"
TO "COERCION"
The crime of extortion is evolving in dramatic contrast to its com-
mon law roots. The common law roots of the offense under federal
law55 are unquestionable; nonetheless, the courts are uprooting the
present definition from its common law soil. This evolution is causing
the offense to expand in scope: it now effectively sweeps within its
ambit of proscribed acts, not only those activities that the common law
conceived of as "extortion," but also those that are more appropriately
dealt with under the rubric of "coercion."
To begin, it is essential to understand the traditional definitions
of "extortion" and "coercion" and the distinctions between the two.
With those definitions in mind, the evolution in meaning that extor-
tion is undergoing can be fully appreciated. The combined effect of
two fundamental changes in the meaning of extortion is working the
subsuming of "extortion" by "coercion." The first of these changes,
the extension of "property" to include intangible as well as tangible
interests, is eminently reasonable. To be sure, this change would have
broadened the meaning of "extortion," but the enhanced scope
would have only reflected modern economic realities. However, the
second change, in conjunction with the first, effected the swallowing
of "extortion" by "coercion." This second change resulted from the
courts' first dissecting the requirement of "obtaining . . . from an-
other" into its component parts of a "getting" of something by a per-
son, for himself or a third party, from another, and a consequent
"deprivation" of the other person of that thing, then eliminating the
"getting" portion. Upon careful examination of this transformation
of the "obtaining... from another," the error in this process is appar-
ent. Moreover, the result of the judicial transformation, i.e., that "ex-
tortion" requires only a "deprivation" rather than both a "getting" and
a "deprivation," is illegitimate. If "extortion" is to be subsumed by
"coercion," that is ajob for Congress, not the courts.
53 See id. § 1951 (1994).
54 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
55 See§ 1951.
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A. Basic Definitions: The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code contains a useful set of definitions from
which to begin this analysis. 56 According to the Model Penal Code, ex-
tortion-originally a common law offense-is properly included
within the consolidated offense of theft. "Extortion" is defined as ob-
taining of the property of another where threat "is the method em-
ployed to deprive the victim of his property."57 In contrast,
"coercion"-originally a statutory offense 58-is defined as making
"specified categories of threats... with the purpose of unlawfully re-
stricting another's freedom of action to his detriment."59
While making threats is a common element of each crime, the
distinction between the crimes concerns the interest each was con-
ceived to protect: "extortion" proscribes threats made in order to ob-
tain the property of another, while "coercion" proscribes threats made in
order to limit another's freedom of action.60 Put simply, "extortion" pro-
tects property while "coercion" protects autonomy.
56 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (1980). The choice to appeal to
the Model Penal Code for these foundational definitions should be relatively uncon-
troversial. See Sandford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code's Historical Antecedents, 19
RuTGERS L.J. 521, 521 (1988) ("[The Model Penal Code] has become ... the principal
text in criminal law teaching, the point of departure for criminal law scholarship, and
the greatest single influence on the many new state codes."); id. at 538 ("The success
of the Model Penal Code has been stunning. Largely under its influence, well over half
the states have adopted revised penal codes .... ").
57 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARiES § 223.4 cmt. 1, at 201 (1980). Under
the Model Penal Code, "extortion" is one of the forms of the consolidated offense of
"theft." Section 223.1(1) of the Code "provides that an accusation of theft may be
supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under
Article 223." Id. § 223, Introductory Note, at 122. The Code replaces the offenses of
"larceny, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion,
receiving stolen property, and the like ... with a unitary offense." Id. Consequently,
the "obtaining" required for extortion under the Code means, "in relation to prop-
erty, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of a legal interest in the property,
whether to the obtainer or another." Id. § 223.0(5) (a), at 124 (emphasis added). The
Code adopts a modem (see infra note 91 and accompanying text), broad definition of
the kind of "property" which can be extorted, including "anything of value, including
real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action
and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, cap-
tured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power." Id. § 223.0(6),
at 124.
58 The crime of coercion was unknown to the common law; instead, its origins
are statutory. See, e.g., State v. Ullman, 5 Minn. 1, 2 (1861); see also Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 17, at 1660.
59 MODEL PENAL CODE AND CoMMENrARIEs § 212.5 cmt. 2, at 264 (1980).
60 Notably, this influential Code itself explicitly endorses this distinction at vari-
ous points in its commentary. At one point the Code states,
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B. The Historical Development of Extortion
1. The Common Law
Federal extortion law is rooted in the common law.61 A statutory
term is usually presumed to maintain its common law meaning.
62
Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects this traditional rule.
63
Behavior prohibited by this section [theft by extortion] is closely analogous
to that proscribed as criminal coercion under Section 212.5.... [Tilhe ma-
jor difference lies in the purpose and effect of the coercive and extortionate
threats. Criminal coercion punishes threats made "with purpose unlawfully
to restrict another's freedom of action to his detriment" while extortion is
included within the consolidated offense of theft because it is restricted to
one who "obtains property of another by" threats.
See id. § 223.4 cmt. 1, at 203. At another, it observes,
It is arguable that these categories of threat [theft by extortion] should be
included in the offense of criminal coercion .... The judgment underlying
the Model Code, however, is that the underlying wrong in extortion-ob-
taining property to which the actor knows he is not entitled-provides a
more reliable basis for punishment than does the Section 212.5 requirement
of a "purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to his
detriment."
Id. at 266; cf Blakey & Roddy, supra note 17, at 1660 ("[Olbtaining of property distin-
guishes extortion from coercion as coercion involves the restriction of another's free-
dom of action by threat.") (emphasis added).
61 For a detailed examination of the history of what became the common law
offense of extortion, beginning with the Magna Carta, see James Lindgren, The Elusive
Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA
L. REv. 815 (1988); cf. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1992) (citing
Lindgren with approval).
62 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 260 (interpreting Hobbs Act extortion: "It is a familiar
'maxim that a statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law mean-
ing'" (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990))). See generally Neder
v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1840 (1999) ("Where Congress uses terms that have
accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer, unless
the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms." (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730 (1989))) (alterations in original); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407,
411-12 (1957) (construing steal); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263
(1952) ("[W]here Congress borrows terms of art... it presumably knows and adopts
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.. . ."); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1910) ("[W]here words are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this
country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense."); United States v. Carll,
105 U.S. 611, 612-13 (1881) (dealing with counterfeiting/forgery); United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 155-56 (1820) (interpreting piracy).
63 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 269 (discussing Hobbs Act extortion, the Court observed
that "[t]he silence of [Congress, which is] the body that is empowered to give us a
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English common law writers largely agreed on the definition of
"extortion."64 For instance, Lord Coke viewed extortion "in [its]
proper sense, [as] a great misprison, by wresting or unlawfully taking
by any officer, by colour of his office, any money or valuable
thing ... either that is not due, or more than is due, or before it be
due."65 William Hawkins (whose opinion later became very influen-
tial throughout England and even spread to America) 66 believed that
extortion
in a large sense signifies any oppression under colour of right; but
that in a strict sense, it signifies the taking of money by any officer,
by colour of his office, either where none at all is due, or not so
much is due, or where it is not yet due.
67
And William Blackstone, 68 in turn, defined extortion as an "abuse of
public justice which consists in an officer's unlawfully taking, by colour
of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is not
due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due.
'69
Two features common to all three definitions stand out. First, in
each, the person extorting (the "extortionist") effects a "taking" from
'contrary direction' if it does not want the common-law rule to survive[,] is consistent
with an application of the normal presumption identified in Taylor and Morissette").
64 As might be expected, these proposed definitions largely tracked those found
in the case law of the time. See, e.g., Regina v. Woodward, 88 Eng. Rep. 949, 949 (Q.B.
1707) ("Indictment against several... stating that they threatened to send [a man] to
[prison] and to indict him of pejury, unless he would give them money and a note;
which he did through their threats.") (emphasis added); Rex v. Burdett, 91 Eng. Rep.
996, 997 (tB. 1696) ("[I]t is not the injury to 'free liberty to sell their wares in the
market' or 'the extorsive agreement' . . . [which] is . . .the offense, but the tak-
ing.. .") (emphasis added); Rex v. Wadsworth, 87 Eng. Rep. 489, 489 (K-B. 1694)
(refusing to quash an indictment for extortion, where the indictment was against a
miller for "taking too great toll") (emphasis added); Rex v. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. 286
(KB. 1692) ("The crime is the taking.... ."); Rex v. Troy, 86 Eng. Rep. 686 (K-B.
1669) (quashing an indictment against an attorney for taking too much money in fees
from his client on grounds of insufficient evidence).
65 3 A S" x -nsric ARRANGEMENT OF LORD CoxE's FmST INsTITUTE 586 (J.H.
Thomas ed., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1826) (emphasis added).
66 See Lindgren, supra note 61, at 864-65 ("Hawkins's definition of extortion was
cited, paraphrased, or followed by the Crown Circuit Companion, Matthew Bacon in A
New Abridgment of the Law, William Russell in A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, and
Francis Wharton in his influential American treatise, A Treatise on the Criminal Law.")
(footnotes omitted).
67 Wnjuum HAWNn'Js, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF TmE CROWN 316 (Thomas
Leach ed., 6th ed., London, His Majesty's Law-Printers 1787) (emphasis added).
68 Blackstone is one of the most influential early writers on extortion. See Lin-
dgren, supra note 61, at 862.
69 4 WnumM BLACySToNE, COMMENTARIES 141 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (em-
phasis added).
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the person being extorted (the "victim").7o That is, the extortionist
both "gets" something and "deprives" the victim of that thing.71 Sec-
ond, whatever is "taken" by the extortionist (and thus "gotten" by the
extortionist, and of which the victim is "deprived") is a tangible inter-
est of economic value; each definition also names that tangible inter-
est as either "money" or some "thing of value" or "valuable thing."
These elements, necessary to the definition of extortion at common
70 The "taking" required for common law "extortion" is the kind of "taking" re-
quired for common law "larceny" or "robbery." See generally CLARK & MARSHALL, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 837-70, 886-88, 897-98 (Marian Quinn Barnes ed,
7th ed. 1967); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 715, 776,
789-90 (2d ed. 1986). "Larceny" was the first of these crimes to be recognized at
common law. See LAFAVE & Sco-rr, supra, at 702. It was defined as "the (1) trespassory
(2) taking and (3) carrying away of the (4) personal property (5) of another (6) with
intent to steal it." Id. at 706; see also CLARK & MARSHALL, supra, at 798 ("[L]arceny at
common law is the taking and carrying away of the personal goods of an-
other... with.., intent to steal the same.").
"Robbery" developed later to punish "larceny" committed in a more aggressive
manner; it "may be thought of as aggravated larceny." LAFAVE & Scorr, supra, at 776.
It consists of the elements of "larceny" "plus two additional requirements: (7) that the
property be taken from the person or presence of the other and (8) that the taking be
accomplished by means of force or putting in fear." Id.; see also CLARK & MARSHALL,
supra, at 882 ("The aggravating circumstances necessary to constitute robbery, as dis-
tinguished from simple larceny, are: (1) The property must be taken from the person
of another ... ; (2) the taking must ... be accomplished either by violence or by
putting him in fear.").
While "robbery" reached many kinds of "larceny" committed by the "aggravated"
means of threats, it was insufficient to punish all kinds of wrongful "taking" so accom-
plished. For while
to obtain another's property by means of a threat of immediate bodily harm
to the victim (or to someone in his company) is robbery; and robbery is held
to embrace also a threat to destroy the victim's home or a threat to accuse
him of sodomy[;] [t]hat was, however, as far as robbery by threats went-
doubtless because the severe penalty for robbery, long a capital offense, re-
strained the courts from expanding robbery to include the acquisition of
property by means of other effective threats-such as a threat to inflict fu-
ture rather than immediate bodily harm, or to destroy the victim's property
other than his house, or to accuse him of some crime other than sodomy, or
to expose his failings or secrets or otherwise to damage his good name or
business reputation.
LAFAV & Scorr, supra, at 789-90. The crime of "extortion, .. . generally carrying a
penalty less severe than for robbery," was therefore developed to fill this gap, covering
"takings" accomplished by these kinds of threats. Id. at 790.
71 In each of the above definitions, both a deprivation and a getting that results
from the deprivation are required. Either by itself is not sufficient; a deprivation is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition of "taking." See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 70,
at 790 n.5 ("If the property is not actually obtained, then there must be a prosecution
for attempted extortion.") (emphasis added).
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law, are precisely the elements required under the definition of extor-
tion proposed in the Model Penal Code (although under the Code
"property" can include "intangible" as well as "tangible" interests).
The Model Penal Code's definition of "coercion," on the other hand,
requires neither of these elements.
2. New York Law: The Field Penal Code of 1865
The American colonists brought with them the English common
law. Subsequently, many grew discontented with the common law and
agitated for codification. This agitation found favor in New York,
72
where David Dudley Field was one the chief proponents of codifica-
tion. Largely under his influence, the State in 1857 set up a commis-
sion to "reduce into a written and systematic code the whole body of
the law of this state or so much and such parts thereof as shall seem to
them practical and expedient."73 Field, William Curtis Noyes, and Al-
exander W. Bradford served as the project's commissioners. 74 The
draft penal code, which was initially assigned to Noyes, was presented
in 1864.75 Field, however, was responsible for the final draft, which
the commissioners reported in 1865.76
Not surprisingly, Field's Penal Code contained an extortion pro-
vision. "Extortion" consisted of the "obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under
color of official right."77 While New York never adopted Field's Penal
Code, the Code served as the prototype for the Penal Code that New
72 See 3 Roscoe PouND, JURISPRUDENCE 709 (1959). Pound observed,
Agitation for codification in New York was in part a phase of the legislative
reform movement of the fore part of the nineteenth century and influenced
by the wide attention given to the writings of Bentham. In part it grew out of
the hostility toward English institutions and English law in the period after
the Revolution and favor toward things French which went along with Jeffer-
sonian democracy. Both were well marked in New York.
Id.
73 Id. at 710-11 (citing 1857 N.Y. LAws ch. 266, 552).
74 See i& at 711.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 PENAL CODE OF =x STATE OF NEwYoRn § 613, at 220 (1865) (emphasis added)
(citing People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. 1827)); see also People v. Whaley, 6 Cow.
661, 663 (N.Y. 1827) ("Extortion... signifies the taking of money" with corrupt in-
tent.). The Code does not define either "obtaining" or "property"; however, later
cases interpreted those provisions. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
"Extortion" under the Field Penal Code, reflecting its common law roots, is part
of the "larceny" series. See PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRV, § 584 cmt at
210-11 (1865) ("larceny"). The Field Penal Code stated,
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York did adopt in 1881;78 the amendments that transformed the Field
Penal Code to the 1881 code did not change the definition of
extortion.
79
Thus, the two distinguishing features of common law extortion
(i.e. (i) the requirement of a "getting" of something from another and
the "deprivation" of the other of that thing, and (ii) the requirement
that a tangible property interest be taken) survived codification in
New York essentially intact. First, while New York law uses the term
"obtaining" where the common law used the term "taking," the terms
are synonymous.8 0 Second, although Field Code extortion referred to
Four of the crimes affecting property require to be somewhat carefully dis-
tinguished; robbery, larceny, extortion, and embezzlement .... All four
include the criminal acquisition of the property of another .... In extortion,
there is again a taking .... Thus extortion partakes in an inferior degree of
the nature of robbey ....
Id. (emphasis added).
78 See United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 654 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that the
Field Code "served as a prototype for a new penal statute, the Penal Code of 1881").
79 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 552 (1881) ("Extortion is the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color
of official right.").
80 "Obtaining... from another," like "taking," requires both a "getting" of prop-
erty by the extortionist from the victim and a "deprivation" of the victim of that prop-
erty; the terms are interchangeable. Thus, New York "extortion" law requires both a
"getting" as well as a "deprivation" for an extortionate "obtaining" to occur. The cases
in support of that proposition are legion. See, e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.
396, 406 n.16 (1973) (interpreting New York law: "extortion requires an intent 'to
obtain that which injustice and equity the party is not entitled to receive'"; the accused
cannot be guilty of extortion unless "actuated by the purpose of obtaining a financial
benefit such as "receiv[ing] a payoff" (quoting People v. Cuddihy, 271 N.Y.S. 450, 456
(Crt. Gen. Sess. 1934))) (emphasis added); Printers II, Inc. v. Professionals Publ'g,
Inc., 615 F. Supp. 767, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (interpreting New York law: "[e]xtortion
requires the taking of property") (emphasis added); People v. Ryan, 133 N.E. 572, 573
(N.Y. 1921) (noting that an intent "to extort" requires an accompanying intent to
"gain money or property"; a mere threat to harm a business is not sufficient); Whaey,
6 Cow. at 663; People v. Squillante, 185 N.Y.S.2d 357, 361 (App. Div. 1959) (stating
that extortion requires an "obtaining of ,operty from another," where "'obtaining of prop-
erty from another imports not only that he give up something but that the obtainer receive
something") (emphasis added); People v. Weinseimer, 102 N.Y.S. 579, 588 (App. Div.)
(stating that in an extortion prosecution, the material issue to be determined is
whether the defendant "receive[d] [money] from the complainant") (emphasis added),
affd, 83 N.E. 1129 (N.Y. 1907); People v. Barondess, 16 N.Y.S. 436, 438 (App. Div.
1891) (describing the effect of codification on common law extortion: "At common
law, extortion . . . was defined to be the taking of money .... [As codified in New
York's Code, it] completes the legislation against robbery"), rev'd on other grounds, 133
N.Y. 649 (1892); People v. Griffin, 2 Barb 427, 429-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1848)
("[flntent to extort" is interpreted, as in a robbery-type offense, to mean "to obtain
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the thing taken as "property," it appears that this property constitutes
the same sort of thing, i.e. "money" or other tangible "thing of value,"
contemplated by the common law.8 ' New York law, then, reflects the
historical distinction between "coercion" and "extortion" as it has
from its original Field codification.
8 2
3. The Hobbs Act
In 1946, Congress passed the Hobbs Act.8 3 The Hobbs Act, as
presently in force, reads in relevant part:
that which injustice and equity the party is not entitled to receive.") (emphasis added);
People v. Cuddihy, 271 N.Y.S. 450, 456 (Crt. Gen. Sess. 1934) (same), affd, 277 N.Y.S.
960 (App. Div. 1935). Compare BLAci's LAw DicrIoNARn 1453 (6th ed. 1990) (defin-
ing "take": "[i]n the law of larceny [of which extortion is part], to obtain or assume
possession of a chattel unlawfully"), with id. 1078 (defining "obtain": "[tlo get hold of by
effort, to get possession of, to procure; to acquire, in any way").
81 See generally Ryan, 133 N.E. at 573 (equating an intent "to extort" with an intent
to "gain money or property"; a mere threat to harm a business is not sufficient) (empha-
sis added); Whaley, 6 Cow. at 663 ("Extortion ... signifies the taking of money.") (em-
phasis added); Weinseimer, 102 N.Y.S. at 588 (arguing that the material issue was
whether the defendant "receive [d] [money] from the complainant"); Barondess, 133
N.Y. at 653-54 ("At common law, extortion . . . was defined to be the taking of
money... [In the Field Code, it] completes the legislation against robbery.") (em-
phasis added). In fact, the argument that the something obtained must be tangible is
even stronger under New York Law than under the common law. the New York provi-
sion, rather than referring to the something taken as a thing of value or the like,
actually uses the term "property."
82 The distinction lives even today. In fact, modem New York extortion law is
even more explicit than earlier versions on the distinction, as well as on both the
"obtaining" (where it hews to traditional roots) and "property" (where it adopts an
expanded modem definition) requirements of extortion. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 135.65 (McKinney 1999) (defining "Coercion in the first degree" as consisting of
"Coercion in the second degree" plus aggravating elements) and N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 135.60 (McKinney 1999) (defining "Coercion in the second degree": "[a] person is
guilty of coercion in the second degree when he compels or induces a person to engage
in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from
engaging in conduct in which he has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in him a
fear") (emphasis added), with N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.05(2) (e) (McKinney 1999) (de-
fining "Larceny by extortion": "A person obtains property by extortion when he com-
pels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by
means of instilling in him a fear") (emphasis added) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(1)
(McKinney 1999) ("'Property' [for the purposes of "larceny" offenses] means any
money, personal property, real property, computer data, computer program, thing in
action, evidence of debt or contract, or any article, substance or thing of value, includ-
ing any gas, steam, water or electricity, which is provided for a charge or
compensation.").
83 See Hobbs Act, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994)). Con-
gress changed the form of the definition of extortion in 1948. However, this change
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(a) Whoever obstructs, delays, or affects commerce.., by... ex-
tortion or attempts or conspires to do so, or commits or threat-
ens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance
of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of ac-
tual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under
color of official right.
8 4
The definition of extortion in the Hobbs Act is drawn from its
predecessor, the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 85 The lan-
guage of the 1934 Act, in turn, was largely fashioned after the defini-
tion of extortion under then current New York law.8 6 In addition,
what was apparent became explicit when Representative Hobbs him-
self acknowledged in the House debates the New York law roots of the
definition of extortion in the Hobbs Act.8 7 Not surprisingly, the lan-
was a consolidation and not a revision. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994) (This "[s]ection
consolidates sections 420a to 420e-1 of Tide 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with changes in
phraseology and arrangement necessary to effect consolidation."). Compare Act of
Jun. 25, 1948, ch. 95, 62 Stat. 793 (1948) with 60 Stat. 420 (1946).
84 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994) (emphasis added).
85 See id. §§ 420a-e (1934). The 1934 Act provided penalties for any person who
(b) [o]btains property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful
use of force or fear, or under color of official right; or
(c) [c]ommits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physi-
cal injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose
to violate subsection [(b)].
Id. § 420a(b)-(c). Although the 1934 Act does not contain the word "extortion," it is
quite clear that Congress meant the statutory language to describe what it viewed as
the essence of extortion; the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee discussing the
bill that would become the 1934 Act stated that it was aimed at "persons who commit
acts of violence, intimidation and extortion." S. REP. No. 73-532, at 1 (1934) (empha-
sis added).
86 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 850 (Consol. 1930) ("Extortion is the obtaining of prop-
erty from another.., with [his] consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear,
or under color of official right.") (emphasis added). This definition has remained
essentially unchanged from its original codification in 1865. See supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
87 See United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Representative
Hobbs[,] [the sponsor of the Hobbs Act,] stated that the term [ ] extortion. .. '[has]
been construed a thousand times by the courts. Everybody knows what [it means].'"
(quoting 91 CONG. REc. 11,912 (1945))); see also 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (state-
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guage used in the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act is the
same as the language used in New York law: extortion requires the
obtaining of property from another. The Supreme Court has held that
when a legislature borrows the language of a statute from thejurispru-
dence of another jurisdiction, the language must be construed in the
sense in which the other jurisdiction used it.88 Therefore, under the
Hobbs Act, "extortion" should require the same two key elements that
it requires under New York law: (i) the extortionist must effect an
"obtaining ... from another," i.e., the extortionist must "get" some-
thing from another and the other must be "deprived" of that thing,
and (ii) the "thing" obtained must be the kind of interest protected
under New York Law which, in turn, comprised the kind of interest
protected under the common law, i.e., money or some other tangible
thing of value.
4. Judicial Interpretation of the Hobbs Act
In the fifty-plus years that followed the passage of the Hobbs Act,
the courts were called upon to construe various aspects of it. When
the issue was squarely raised, they unequivocally recognized the dis-
ment of Rep. Hobbs) ("The definitions in this bill are copied from the New York
Code substantially."); id. at 11,914 (statement of Rep. Russell); id. at 11,905 (remarks
of Rep. Robsion); id at 11,843 (remarks of Rep. Michener); id. at 11,842 (remarks of
Rep. Walter). The relevant legislative materials are thoroughly discussed in United
States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 651-55 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
88 See Willis v. E. Trust & Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1897) (holding that
the words of such borrowed language must be "construed in the sense in which they
were understood at the time in that system from which they were taken"); Metro. R.R.
Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 572 (1887) (same); see also Felix Frankftirter, Some Reflec-
tions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 537 (1947) ("[I]f a word is
obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other
legislation, it brings the old soil with it."); cf. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
259-60 (1992) (dealing with Hobbs Act extortion). In Evans, the Court observed,
As we have explained: "[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it pre-
sumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.
In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with
widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). In Evans, the Court recognized the
New York law roots of Hobbs Act extortion. See id. at 261-62 n.9. It did the same in
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 406 n.16 (1972). Consequently, those elements
of the common law imported into the New York Law were also imported into the
Hobbs Act.
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tinction between "extortion" and "coercion."8 9 Nevertheless, two lines
of cases have recently emerged that are leading to the obliteration of
the distinction.
a. Property
In the first of these lines, the federal courts gradually altered the
kind of property that must be obtained to constitute extortion. 90 As
89 See, e.g., United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 793 F. Supp. 1114,
1131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding erroneous the government's contention that the
difference between coercion and extortion is an "irrelevant" distinction: " [Extortion
requires the taking of property from a person whereas coercion simply requires the forcing
of a person to do something against his will. The distinction is not trivial" (citing Enmons,
410 U.S. at 406 n.16, and United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 296 (1969))) (em-
phasis added); Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F. Supp. 213, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("'[Coercion [in contrast to extortion] . . . is not among
the .. .laws ... providing a basis for RICO liability.") (emphasis added).
90 The expansion of the notion of "property" or "thing of value" is not unique to
extortion. Extortion is one of many offenses under Title 18 of the U.S.C. that uses
some variation of "property" or "thing of value." See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)
("anything of value") (bribery); Id. § 1341 ("property") (mail fraud); Id. § 1951
("property") (extortion). These concepts are the source of much of the modern
growth of federal criminal law. See, e.g., United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d
Cir. 1979) (finding law enforcement information to be a "thing of value" within 18
U.S.C. § 641 (stolen property)). Girard collected a wide range of decisions on "thing
of value"; it concluded that "[t ] he word 'thing' not withstanding, the phrase is gener-
ally construed to cover intangibles as well as tangibles." Girard, 601 F.2d at 71 (citing
decisions construing "thing of value" to include amusement under a gambling statute,
sexual intercourse under a bribery statute, and the testimony of a witness under an
extortion statute); see also United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (6th Cir.
1986) (finding that loans and promises of future employment constitute "things of
value" within 18 U.S.C. § 201); United States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 679 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding that assistance in arranging a union merger constitutes a "thing of
value" within 18 U.S.C. § 1954). Compare United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354,
1361-62 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that the labor of a government employee constitutes
a "thing of value" within 18 U.S.C. § 641), with Chappell v. United States, 270 F.2d
274 (9th Cir. 1959) (finding contra; criticized in Schwartz, 785 F.2d at 681 n.4, and
Croft, 750 F.2d at 1362). But see United States v. Sandoval, 20 F.3d 134, 136-37 (5th
Cir. 1994) (finding that a taxpayer who offered information on other tax evaders did
not offer a "thing of value" within 18 U.S.C. § 201).
One author in particular observed that, while property offenses ("larceny," "rob-
bery," etc.) traditionally focused on acquisitive behavior, modern offenses typically
focus on aspects of the political and economic order (government corruption,
schemes to defraud, etc.). See Sandford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Crim-
inal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CI. L. REv. 423, 425 (1963)
(arguing that while the traditional offenses restricted the behavior of some to free the
behavior of others to enjoy what they had, modern offenses, in contrast, control pub-
lic and private behavior rather than free it, so that a particular kind of political and
economic order may be achieved); cf Francis A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in Amen-
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noted above, the Hobbs Act, by importation of the gloss of the New
York law (which in turn imported considerations of the common law),
envisions "property" as either money or some other like tangible
"thing of value." Initially, the courts expressed a general 'willingness
to extend the notion of "property" or "thing of value" to interests that
were intangible. 91 For the Hobbs Act, this expansion brought within
its scope such intangible interests as the right to hire employees and
the right to solicit business accounts.
92
The courts then broadened this notion further to include inter-
ests that seem to border on civil liberties, such as the right to conduct
a business free from threats and violence.93 United States v. Local 56094
is an instructive example of this tendency. There, the court found
that a union membership collectively held an "intangible property
can CriminalJustice: Some Latter-Day Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 A~iz. L.
REv. 385 (1987) (arguing that this extension of the traditional offenses violates the
principle of nulla poena sine lege).
91 See, e.g., THOMAS ERsKnNE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS oFJUIUSPRUDENCE 183 (Ox-
ford, Clarendon Press, 6th ed. 1890) ("[T]he idea of ownership has been so far ex-
tended as to make it applicable to certain closely coherent masses of rights; which are
thus, by a legal fiction, treated, for certain purposes, as if they were tangible objects.");
id. at 181 ("Ownership is exercised, in its primary and fullest sense, over physical
objects only. It is also exercised, in a secondary and conventional sense, over certain
collections of rights which it is convenient to treat upon the analogy of physical
objects.").
92 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1986) (protect-
ing the right to hire employees); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1174 (9th
Cir. 1980) (finding that a victim's right to solicit business free from threatened de-
struction and physical harm falls within the scope of protected property rights under
Hobbs Act); United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussing
the right to solicit business: "such intangible property has been held to be included
within those rights protected by the [Hobbs] Act"); United States v. Tropiano, 418
F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[P]roperty... includes... any valuable right consid-
ered as a source or element of wealth.").
93 See, e.g., United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that
property includes the " right to conduct a business free from threats of violence and physical
ha7m") (emphasis added), aftig United States v. Arena, 918 F. Supp. 561, 568
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The court starts from the uncontested proposition that the right to
conduct a lawful business free from threats and violence is property within the mean-
ing of the Hobbs Act." (citing Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d
92, 101 (2d Cir. 1990), and Tropiano, 418 F.2d at 1077)); United States v. Hoelker, 765
F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (protecting not only the money extorted from the
victim by those who forced him to buy a life insurance policy naming them as the
beneficiaries, but also the victim's "right to make personal and business decisions about the
purchase of life insurance on his own life free of threats and coercion") (emphasis added);
United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978) (protecting the right to
make business decisions free from outside pressure wrongfully imposed).
94 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985).
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right to democratic participation in the affairs of their union," and the
right was "properly considered extortable 'property' for purposes of
the Hobbs Act."95 Local 560 thus reaches a questionable result, under-
scoring that once the concept of property is extended beyond tangi-
ble property, the crucial distinction becomes the elusive difference
between "intangible property" and "intangible rights."
96
The courts have also struggled with the distinction between
"property" and "rights" under other provisions of Title 18 of the U.S.
Code. The path of the decisions is not straight. Nor is it even consis-
tent between provisions. For example, while frequent flyer mileage,
97
shareholder information,9 8 spending control,99 and postal services' 0 0
are all property within the mall and wire fraud statutes, 10 1 market
share10 2 is excluded-a result that is disconcerting, given that deci-
sions under the Hobbs Act would find that it is "property."'0 3 Fortu-
95 Id. at 282.
96 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352, 355-60 (1987) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1956) and holding that the right of hon-
est governmental service is an "intangible right," and not "intangible property"), set
aside by 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1989) (rendering it unlawful "to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services"). McNally, though decided under the mail fraud
statutes, is instructive on the issue of distinguishing between intangible rights and
intangible property. The decision is a much unappreciated effort by the Supreme
Court to curtail the exuberance of federal prosecutors unchecked by the lowerjudici-
ary to transform the mail fraud statute from a nineteenth-century property-based of-
fense into a twentieth-century all-purpose corruption tool. See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolution" of a Wte-
Collar Crime, 21 AM. CIM. L. REV. 1 (1983). Congress, however, agreed with the prose-
cutors, not the Court, in enacting almost immediately § 1346-as the Court itself ac-
knowledged was the legislature's prerogative. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216-19 (1985), was a similar effort by the
Supreme Court, set aside by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1996). Dowling excluded
bootleg records under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1968) from RICO; that decision, however,
was supplanted by § 2320, which also set aside the result in Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d
1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding copyright violations outside the scope of RICO).
97 See United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1992) (construing
"property" and "thing of value"); United States v. Schreier, 908 F.2d 645, 647 (10th
Cir. 1990).
98 See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 464-66 (2d Cir. 1991).
99 See United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 651-52 (8th Cir. 1990).
100 See United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1162 (2d Cir. 1989).
101 Both of which are RICO predicate offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (Supp. III
1997).
102 See Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp., 940 F.2d 397,
405-06 (9th Cir. 1991).
103 Lancaster cannot be squared with decisions under the Hobbs Act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that the right to
make business decisions free from threats constitutes extortable "property"); United
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nately though, while the "rights"/"property" distinction may generally
be convoluted under Title 18, for the limited purposes of Hobbs Act
extortion it is not so troublesome. As noted above, under the extor-
tion statute the courts have consistently confined property interests to
those interests having some concrete value which, although possibly
somewhat speculative, is ascertainable in terms of dollars and cents
within the limits of argument (for example, the value of being able to
hire a particular employee, the value of a particular business account,
or the value of a particular business decision made correctly instead of
under threat).
The extension of the meaning of extortable "property" or "thing
of value" in this first line of cases, then, is eminently reasonable. The
question turns on what is meant by "property" or "thing of value,"
which, in turn, depends initially on how those terms were used at com-
mon law. Certainly, these terms included "tangible" interests.
Whether the common law meaning was necessarily limited to "money"
or some like "tangible" thing, or extended to all "things" that might
have "value" is debatable. Nevertheless, this broadening of the con-
cept to include "tangible" property interests and "intangible" property
interests when they reflect modem forms of wealth is surely reason-
able-at least to the extent that those rights, in fact, comprise "a
source or element of wealth"d ' 0 4 with a reasonably certain economic
value. And as indicated above, this expanded definition of property is
the one adopted by the Model Penal Code. Thus, the judicial extension
of "property" is justifiable based on the changes that have occurred in
the ways in which wealth is owned in a modem society. 10 5 The protec-
tion of ownership was, after all, the purpose of extortion.
b. Obtaining
In contrast, the judiciary's treatment of the "obtaining" require-
ment of extortion is illegitimate. In a second line of cases, the courts
have radically changed that requirement by reading out the "getting"
element of "obtaining" and requiring only that a victim show a "depri-
States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that a garbage
pick-up stop constitutes extortable "property").
104 Tropiano, 418 F.2d at 1075.
105 Thomas Holland wrote,
The notion that nothing is property which cannot be ear-marked and recov-
ered in detinue or trover, may be true in an early stage of society, when
property is in its simple form, and the remedies for violation of it are also
simple, but it is not true in a more civilized state, when the relations of life
and the interests arising therefrom are complicated.
HOLLAND, supra note 91, at 183.
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vation." This line of decisions represents, not a reasonable growth of
the offense, but a departure from its common law roots-and, in fact,
a re-definition of the offense.
The path followed may be traced in two steps. In the first step,
courts were willing to find extortion when the "getting" and "depriva-
tion" that are both required for an extortionate "obtaining" were
achieved by two different actors. That is, courts found extortion in
cases where the extortionist "deprived" the victim of his property but
directed that a person other than himself "get" it. This made sense, as
in such a case the property is still "obtained" just as surely as if the
extortionist himself "got" it; both elements, the "depriving" and the
"getting," are present.
United States v. Green'0 6 was the seminal case in this line. Two
defendants, a union and a union representative, were charged with
extortion under the Hobbs Act. The prosecution alleged that the de-
fendants had attempted to obtain money from an employer by threat-
ening to use force. 10 7 The employer paid the money not to the
defendants but to others (known as "swampers") in exchange for "im-
posed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitious services." s08 The defend-
ants argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict them of
extortion, because they did not in any way benefit from their actions.
The trial judge agreed and arrested a judgment of conviction against
the defendants for insufficiency of the indictment.10 9 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed, holding that "extortion as defined in [the
Hobbs Act] ... in no way depends upon having a direct benefit con-
ferred on the person who obtains the property."" 0
United States v. Provenzano"' marks the second step in the evolu-
tion of "obtaining." Anthony Provenzano was an officer of a trucking
union that held a labor contract with the Dorn Company. Under
Provenzano's influence, truck drivers in the union refused to perform
certain functions and brought the Dorm Company's terminal to a
standstill. When Dora, Vice President of the company, spoke to
Provenzano about resolving the difficulties, Provenzano suggested
that the drivers would perform the required functions if Dorm would
agree to pay an extra $100 per week. Rather than have the money
transferred directly to him, Provenzano directed Dora to put an attor-
106 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
107 See i. at 417.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 418.
110 Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
111 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964).
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ney, recommended by Provenzano, on retainer for that amount.
When Dorn began to pay, the truckers resumed their duties.
At his trial, despite Green, Provenzano argued that he did not
commit extortion because he did not receive any benefit, either direct
or indirect, from Dorn. The Third Circuit disagreed. It began by
quoting Green for the proposition that "extortion as defined in the
statute in no way depends upon having a direct benefit conferred on
the person who obtains the property."n 2 Then, the court took a wrong
turn. Acknowledging the roots of the Hobbs Act, the court looked to
New York law in an effort to refute the defendant's contention that
extortion required that at least some indirect benefit be conferred.11 3
The court relied on two New York cases, People v. Fichtnern 4 and People
v. Scheppa,n 5 observing that in both of those cases, the money ex-
torted was paid to a third person (i.e., someone other than the extor-
tionist),116 The court concluded that "[i]nsofar as we are able to
ascertain[,] there is no statutory or common law of New York requir-
ing that the extortioner benefit. The gravamen of the offense is loss to the
victim." 1 7 The court thus mistakenly linked two distinct ideas: (i) an
extortionist need not benefit from the extortion, and (ii) the grava-
men of extortion is loss to the victim.
The two ideas state a valid proposition when so linked, taking the
first idea as primary and the second idea as modifying the first. Even
so, this holding sweeps within the ambit of extortion those acts in
112 Id. at 686 (citing Green, 350 U.S. at 417) (first emphasis added).
113 The defendant had argued that, given the Supreme Court's choice of language
in Green to the effect that no "direct" benefit need be conferred on one who obtains
the property, the Hobbs Act required that at least some indirect benefit be conferred.
See Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 686.
114 118 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (App. Div. 1952) (affirming conviction of defendants,
clerks in a grocery store who extorted $25 from a customer by threatening to prose-
cute him for shoplifting, stating that "[ilt is not disputed that the $25 taken from
Smith was 'rung up' on the store register; that the money went into the company
funds and that defendants received no part of the money").
115 67 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 1946) (affirming Scheppa's conviction for extortion, de-
spite the fact that the jury had acquitted Calabria, Scheppa's co-defendant). In af-
firming the conviction, the court noted that
[t]he money was later actually paid to Calabria, to be turned over to appel-
lant, and there is no proof that Calabria did turn it over. But there was testi-
mony from which the jury could find that Calabria was acting not as an agent
for, or collaborator with, appellant, but as a friend of complainant, believ-
ing, however mistakenly, that discretion in compliance would serve com-
plainant better than valor in resistance.
Id at 582.
116 Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 686.
117 Id (emphasis added).
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which an extortionist receives nothing at all, but instead causes a vic-
tim to give property to a third person. Thus, it expands the meaning
of Green from "one who obtains property need not himself benefit" to
"one who extorts property need not himself get it." Still, the proposi-
tion contained in these two ideas when they are read together is de-
fensible-it preserves the requirement that there be both a "getting"
and a consequent "deprivation" for an extortionate "obtaining" to oc-
cur, and it opens up liability to both the "depriver" and the "getter."
The sweeping language of the second proposition when taken
alone, however, is erroneous. First, the statement in isolation does
not reflect the holding in Provenzano, which contradicts the sweeping
language:
[W] e hold that it is not necessary to prove that the extortioner him-
self, directly or indirectly, received the fruits of his extortion or any
benefit therefrom. The Hobbs Act does not require such proof. It
is enough that payments were made at the extortioner's direction to a person
named by him."1 18
Second, the statement is a misreading of Fichtner. The holding of
Fichtner deals with the difference between the words "gain" and "ob-
tain." Fichtnerteaches that to be convicted of extortion, property must
be "obtained," but the property need not constitute a "gain" to the
defendant; an individual can commit extortion even if the money "ob-
tained" thereby is legitimately owed to the extortionist, so that he real-
izes no "gain." In Fichtner, the court held that it would not have
mattered if the defendant, a store clerk, reasonably believed that the
victim had actually stolen the amount of money the defendant ex-
torted from him from the clerk's store. Third, the sweeping language
was based upon a poorly worded jury instruction, which the
Provenzano court took out of context,"19 and which the Fichtner court
did not in fact adopt. 20 Finally, the court, although purporting to
118 Id. (emphasis added).
119 See Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d at 395-96. The court charged, without exception,
that
it is immaterial that the person who obtains the money retains no part of the
proceeds; the gist of the crime is the loss of money by Smith by reason of a
criminal act on the part of defendants .... As heretofore stated, defendants
were found guilty on both counts.
Id. (emphasis added).
120 In fact, the court implicitly rejected it as being too liberal in favor of the
defendant:
In our opinion, the extortion statutes were intended to prevent the collection
of money by the use of fear induced by means of threats to accuse a debtor of
crime, and it makes no difference whether the debtor stole any goods, nor
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state New York law concerning extortionate "obtaining," plainly did
not do so.'
2 '
The flaws in the sweeping language of Provenzano did not prevent
it from being picked up by other courts. Only seven years after
Provenzano was decided, the Fifth Circuit used the sweeping language.
In United States v. Hyde,122 Joseph Gantt was accused of extortion by
forcing a company to sell its stock to a third person, one Bowen. Up-
holding Gantt's extortion conviction, the court quoted Provenzano for
the proposition that "[o]ne need receive no personal benefit to be
guilty of extortion; the gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim."123 As
in Provenzano, this sweeping language in Hyde was dicta; the third
party did, in fact, "get" the stock of which the extortionist had "de-
prived" the company.
The sweeping language of Provenzano soon spread like wildfire
through the pages of the federal reporters. 124 The result of this con-
how much he stole, and that defendants may properly be convicted even
though they believed that the complainant was guilty of the theft of their
employer's goods ....
Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
121 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
122 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971).
123 Id at 843 (emphasis added).
124 As in Provenzano and Hyde, the sweeping language is inapposite in each of
these cases; in each the extortionist himself or some third party clearly "got" the prop-
erty of which the extortionist "deprived" the victim. See, e.g., United States v. Hair-
ston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving defendants who forced three
different companies to make contributions to charitable and political organizations
and stating, in dicta, that the "gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim") (citing
United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Carlock,
806 F.2d 535, 555 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving a defendant who ordered a victim to
make payments of money to a company owned by defendant's daughter-in-law and
stating, in dicta, that "the gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim") (citing Hyde,
448 F.2d at 843, and Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 686); United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358,
364 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving a defendant who ordered the victim to deposit one
million dollars into the account of a third party and stating, in dicta, that "[I ] oss to
the victim is the gravamen of the offense") (citing United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d
884, 887 (8th Cir. 1977), United States v. Lance, 536 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir. 1976),
and Hyde, 448 F.2d at 843); Santoni, 585 F.2d at 673 (involving a defendant who
forced the victim, a company, to award a subcontract to another company and stating,
in dicta, that "the gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim") (citing Frazier, 560
F.2d at 887); Frazier, 560 F.2d at 887 (involving a defendant who attempted to extort
$150,000 from a bank by having an accomplice-who was to receive the extorted
money-strap an explosive device to the bank manager and stating, in dicta, that
"It] he gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim") (citing United States v. Jacobs,
451 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1971), Hyde, 448 F.2d at 843, and Provenzano 334 F.2d at
686); Lance; 536 F.2d at 1068 (involving a defendant who extorted money from an
individual; the defendant claimed that his intent was only to borrow the money and
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flagration is astonishing: the sweeping language, standing alone, effec-
tively discards the requirement that an extortionist or some other
third party "get" the property of which the victim is "deprived." In-
stead, extortionate "obtaining" now requires only that the victim be
"deprived" of something. In short, to "obtain" now means only to
"deprive."
The mantra that "one need receive no personal benefit to be
guilty of extortion because the gravamen of the offense is loss to the
victim" was repeated so frequently that eventually courts took it liter-
ally. Courts began to find extortion, without any analysis, in cases
where no one-neither the extortionist nor a third party-"got" the
property of which the extortionist "deprived" the victim. United States
v. Anderson125 exemplifies this trend. Don Anderson kidnapped and
threatened a doctor who performed abortions. He threatened that,
unless the doctor could convince him of the doctor's sincerity in
promising to cease performing abortions, the doctor and his wife
would be killed. In affirming the defendant's Hobbs Act conviction,
the Seventh Circuit did not examine whether anyone had "gotten"
anything as a result of the alleged extortion. It summarily held that
because the threats were directed toward forcing an abortion provider
to cease performing abortions, the evidence was sufficient to support
the conviction. 126 This approach ignores the fundamental nature of
extortion, which has been confirmed time and again from its com-
mon law roots through its Hobbs Act codification: extortion is a lar-
ceny-type offense protecting "property." To remove the "getting"
requirement is to transform the crime from one prohibiting an extor-
tionist or a third party to "get" from a victim to one prohibiting an
extortionist to force a victim to act inconsistently with the victim's best
stating, in dicta, that "the gravamen of the offense is loss to the victim") (citing Hyde,
448 F.2d at 843, and Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 686); see also United States v. Haimowitz,
725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir. 1984) (involving a defendant who ordered the victim
to pay money to a third party, and, while not quoting the key language, finding extor-
tion because the defendant "participated in the scheme to induce [the victim] to part
with his property") (citing Hyde, 448 F.2d at 843); Jacobs, 451 F.2d at 535 (involving a
defendant who forced the victim to buy a bus license and, while not quoting the key
language, explaining that Hobbs Act extortion does not require that the extortionist
benefit from his acts) (citing Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 685).
125 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983).
126 See id. at 450. Yet, even this egregious holding is justifiable on the facts of the
record, though the court did not discuss the key facts in any detail. The record in-
cluded evidence that the victim, a doctor who performed abortions, was actually ex-
torted of $300. See id. at 447. The Anderson court did not discuss this fact in its
analysis. Instead, the court found it sufficient that the defendant attempted to force
an abortion provider to cease performing abortions.
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interests by "giving up" something. In short, dropping the "getting"
requirement changes extortion from an offense protecting "property"
to one protecting "autonomy." Clearly, that kind of "extortion" is up-
rooted from its common law and New York law soil.
127
5. The Result: "Extortion" Becomes "Coercion"
When the modification of "obtaining" is combined with the ex-
pansion of "property," "extortion" becomes not only "the obtaining of
property from another"128 through the use of threats, but also the use
of threats to deprive another of his right to make decisions free from outside
127 In a climate which encourages the reading out of "getting" from extortion, it is
probably not shocking to learn that one author suggested that the Hobbs Act can be
applied even further. See Craig M. Bradley, NOW v. Scheidler: RJCO Meets the First
Amendmen 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 129 (1994). Caught up in the expanded extortion
fever, Bradley, agreeing with the analysis that rejects reading "getting" out of extor-
tion, nevertheless suggested the following alternative approach:
[T]here is more to the Hobbs Act than the plaintiffs, or anyone else, seem to
have realized. The statute forbids obstructing, delaying, or affecting com-
merce by robbery or extortion, or attempting or conspiring so to do. As
discussed, "obtaining property" by the defendant is an element of extortion
(and of robbery). But, the statute goes on to forbid "committ[ing] or
threaten [ing] physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section." No "obtaining
property" qualification applies to this portion of the statute.
This rather confusing clause is susceptible of two interpretations. First
it may simply forbid committing or threatening violence in furtherance of a
plan to obstruct commerce by robbery or extortion. But this interpretation
makes no sensel ...
The other possible reading is more sensible. It forbids threatening or
committing physical violence in furtherance of a plan to "obstruct delay or
affect commerce" (other than through robbery or extortion).
Id. at 142-43. Although this novel approach would eliminate the "getting" require-
ment by allowing the use of the Hobbs Act to reach situations in which no property
was "gotten," it clearly violates the meaning of this section. So far, the courts have not
followed Professor Bradley's suggestions. See United States v. Yankowski, 184 F.3d
1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). The court observed,
The government ... argues that.., the Hobbs Act criminalizes any act of
violence to person or property that has an effect on commerce, even if the
alleged violent act had no connection to any executed or planned robbery
or extortion. The government's position is untenable in light of the clear
language of the Hobbs Act.
Id.; see also id. at 1073 ("The statutory language is clear: A person may violate the
Hobbs Act by committing or threatening a violent act against person or property, but
only if it is in furtherance of a plan to interfere with commerce by extortion or robbery.") (em-
phasis added).
128 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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pressure wrongfully imposed. Using threats wrongfully to pressure a per-
son to make decisions in a way that he otherwise would not, however,
is the same thing as using threats for the purpose of "unlawfully re-
stricting another's freedom of action to his detriment." Thus, under
this new definition, extortion becomes a kind of coercion; or, more
precisely, "coercion" swallows "extortion."
This subsumption of "extortion" by "coercion," besides just mud-
dling two formerly distinct offenses, also works another important
change: it expands the list of "racketeering activities" to those that
touch on social and political protest. In the past, extortion generally
would not have reached such activity, so long as the protesters in-
volved seek (as is typically the case) not to "get!' business for them-
selves or others, but to put others out of business-to "deprive" them
of "property." It does now. In sum, the two changes in extortion com-
bine to threaten First Amendment freedoms.
IV. EXPANDED ExToRrION AND RICO LIABILITY
RICO can now be used against persons who commit Hobbs Act
extortion-including people whose behavior would otherwise be
deemed coercive-as a "pattern of racketeering activity."1 29 Because
RICO violation can subject a defendant to liability for treble damages
and attorneys' fees, this liability can be enormous-espeically after the
Third Circuit's decision in Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle.130
In McMonagle, the court reasoned by analogy to the award of at-
torneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in civil rights cases under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and concluded that the attorneys' fees awarded pursu-
ant to RICO provision § 1964(c) need not be in any way "propor-
tional" to the amount of damages recovered.1 31 The analogy seems
strained, as extortion-and thus RICO with extortion predicates-
protects property interests, not civil rights.13 2 Even so, the result
might be defensible, at least to the extent that such rights bear a dis-
cernable monetary value, were it not for the chilling effect on First
Amendment protest this gives the RICO/Hobbs Act combination.1 33
The combined effects of the subsumption of extortion by coer-
cion can be seen in the use of RICO and the Hobbs Act to silence
social and political protest over the past ten years.
129 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
130 889 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1989).
131 Id. at 475. ("We thus conclude that the district court properly refused to apply
a proportionality rule to reduce the RICO fee award in this case.").
132 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
133 See infra Part VI.B.
NOTE: PROTESTERS, EXTORTION, AND COERC;ON
A. RICO and the Hobbs Act Applied to Political Protesters
Since 1989, five circuits have applied the provisions of the Hobbs
Act-and all but one of those, the Hobbs Act as a RICO predicate-to
the activities of social and political protesters. These decisions illus-
trate the problems that occur when the expanded definitions of
"property" and "obtaining" are incorporated into extortion.
1. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonag'
3 4
McMonagle was the first decision in which a circuit court found
anti-abortion protesters liable to clinics under civil RICO. It has also
been the foundation of several later decisions. Consequently, this de-
cision and its supporting analysis merit a close examination.
Prior to McMonagle, the Third Circuit's Hobbs Act jurisprudence
was unremarkable; it was contained in two major cases. In the first,
United States v. Nedley,' 35 the defendant was accused of robbery in vio-
lation of the Hobbs Act. The Government contended that because
the Hobbs Act required only an "obtaining" whereas the common law
required a "taking," the Hobbs Act was broader than common law
"robbery."13 6 Consequently, the Government argued that the Hobbs
Act covered Nedley's actions-even though Nedley had not tried to
"take" anything from his victim, but had only threatened to put him
out of business if he did not comply with the Nedley's wishes. The
Third Circuit flatly rejected the Government's argument. It carefully
traced the roots of the Hobbs Act. First, it observed that the Hobbs
Act was largely based on New York law,'3 7 which did not distinguish
between "obtaining" and "taking.' 38 The court then observed that
New York law largely codified the common law, which also required a
"taking."13 9 The court therefore refused to expand the definition of
"robbery" under the Hobbs Act in the way requested by the Govern-
ment, instead holding to the common law and New York law outlines
of the offense. 1
40
134 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
135 255 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958).
136 Id. at 354.
137 Id. at 355.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 356.
140 See id. at 357 ("'Robbery' under the Hobbs Act, is common law robbery, and
robbery as defined by the New York Penal Laws and construed by the courts of that
State.").
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One year later, the Third Circuit decided United States v. Swee-
ney.141 In that case, it found that the definition of "extortion" in the
Hobbs Act was constrained by the same limitations as the definition of
"robbery." The Sweeney court admonished the lower court, on retrial,
to "keep in mind the opinion[] of this Court" in Nedley'4 2 because
Nedley involved an offense which, like Hobbs Act extortion, is a "lar-
ceny-type offense[]." 143 It also recognized that Hobbs Act extortion
was "derived from the New York Code."'144 At least in the Third Cir-
cuit, then, Nedley and Sweeney mandate that Hobbs Act extortion re-
flect its common law roots and its New York heritage. McMonagle
ignored this precedent, however, and reached its holding in a vastly
different manner.
The facts of McMonagle are as follows. The Northeast Women's
Center (Center) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania provided various gyne-
cological services, including pregnancy testing and abortions.145 Anti-
abortion demonstrators picketed the Center, trying to block access
and dissuade patients from entering, as often as three days a week for
nine years. 146 Their conduct also included demonstrations, picketing
in public fora, chanting, leafleting, and other activities unquestionably
protected by the First Amendment. During the demonstrations, the
protesters also trespassed on the clinic's premises on four different
occasions. In July 1986, the Center lost its lease and moved to a new
location; the protests continued at the new location. As a result of the
protests, the Center brought suit against thirteen protesters, 47 but
later amended its complaint to include forty-two defendants. 48
At trial, the Center offered evidence of all the protected conduct
as well as the four instances of trespass. The Center also introduced
141 262 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1959).
142 Id. at 275.
143 Id.
144 Id at 275 n.3 (citing United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1958));
see also id. ("In the House debate on the bill, Representative Hobbs, its sponsor, stated
that 'the definitions in this bill are copied from the New York Code substantially.'").
The court reaffirmed this thinking as late as 1985, when in United States v. Agnes, 753
F.2d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 1985), it declared that "[t]he legislative history leaves no doubt
that the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act was to be the same as that under
the New York Code as construed by the New York courts in 1946, when the Act be-
came effective."
145 Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1345 (3d Cir.
1989).
146 Linda Greenhouse, Abortion Foes Lose Plea for Hearing on Their Racketeering Law
Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1989, at A23.
147 Northeast Women's Ctr. v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1989).
148 Id.
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evidence that the protesters, besides invading the Center, subjected
three employees to repeated picketing at their homes, and that two of
those employees quit their jobs.149 The Center alleged a number of
theories of liability, but only those of common law tort and RICO with
Hobbs Act extortion predicates went to the jury.
Regarding the RICO claim, the plaintiffs invoked 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962 (c), alleging that the defendants were participating in the con-
duct of an enterprise engaged in Hobbs Act extortion. 150 The jury
found twenty-seven defendants liable under the RICO claim and as-
sessed $887.00 in damages, the cost of repairing medical equipment
broken by protesters. 151 Pursuant to the statute, the court trebled the
award to $2,661.78.152 Even trebled, the actual damages pale in com-
parison to the attorneys' fees and costs awarded to the plaintiff pursu-
ant to the statute-those totaled $64,946.11.153
On appeal, the Third Circuit acknowledged that RICO "was be-
ing applied in contexts far beyond those originally intended."' 54 Nev-
ertheless, the court upheld the award. First, it found that "economic
motive" is not an element of a RICO violation itself; rather, as long as
a defendant commits the acts proscribed by the statute, he is liable
regardiess of his reason for committing those acts. In the court's
words, "Defendants argue that because their actions were motivated
by their political beliefs, civil RICO is inapplicable. Defendants' de-
scription of their conduct as 'civil disobedience' does not thereby im-
munize it from statutes proscribing the very acts the jury found
Defendants committed."155
Next, the court addressed the defendants' objections that their
actions did not constitute extortion. Predictably, the court high-
lighted the expansion of property for the purposes of extortion. It
noted that, although no tangible property was extorted, the right of
the Center to conduct its business, of which the defendants had
149 McMonagle 868 F.2d at 1346.
150 Id. at 1347.
151 Id In the end only 26 defendants were actually held liable; the trial court
dismissed one defendant post-trial. Id. at 1345 n.2.
152 Id. at 1347.
153 McMonagle, 889 F.2d at 470. The court justified this award of attorney's fees by
a questionable analogy to the civil rights laws. See supra note 131 and accompanying
text.
154 McMonagle 868 F.2d at 1348 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 499-500 (1985)).
155 Id. at 1348.
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sought to deprive the Center, constituted a property interest for the
purposes of the Hobbs Act.
15 6
Strangely, the court never directly addressed the "obtaining" re-
quirement of extortion, though it was argued by the defense. 157 In-
stead, it rested its analysis on an issue not argued at trial, though,
according to the court, raised on appeal by the defendants-whether
"motive," and specifically an "economic motive," is an element re-
quired for a Hobbs Act violation.158 The court decided that "eco-
nomic motive" is not an element of a Hobbs Act violation, just as it
found "economic motive" was not an element of a RICO violation.
The court began by stating that under "well-established prece-
dent... lack of economic motive does not constitute a defense to
Hobbs Act crimes.1 59 To buttress this assertion, the court quoted
from United States v. Cerilli,160 a case in which the court upheld a
Hobbs Act conviction for solicitation of political contributions, stat-
ing, "It is well-established that a person may violate the Hobbs Act
without himself receiving the benefits of his coercive actions."1 61 It
concluded by citing United States v. Starks for the proposition that
"there is no exception to the Hobbs Act" permitting extortion "for a
156 Id. at 1350 ("Rights involving the conduct of a business are property rights."
(citing United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), United States v.
Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1978), United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340 (5th
Cir. 1973), and United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969)).
157 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, app. A at A-163, McMonagle v. Northeast
Women's Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (No. 88-2137) (Defendants Exhibit 5-5-
Points for Charge on Extortion). In fact, counsel for the defendant also objected to a
proposed jury instruction on obtaining as incorrectly defining that requirement:
MR. STANTON: Your Honor, I have a comment on the extortion [in-
struction]. I am looking at the jury instruction from New York, New York
Standard Criminal Jury Instruction on extortion and it does say that the
property can't be just surrendered. The property has to be appropriated by
the alleged extortee [sic] third person. The impression is left from this in-
struction that if somebody surrendered something, including an intangible
property right, that's all that's necessary. There has to be a showing some-
thing was appropriated, by the person committing the extortion or then
transferred to a third-party and that [sic] the problem I have with this in-
struction. It leaves the instruction if somebody surrendered something that
[sic] all that's necessary.
Id. at 26 n.29.
158 See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349-50 ("Defendants argue that the court's charge
failed to deal 'with the economic motivation behind the crime of extortion'.... De-
fendants point to no charge proffered by them on economic purpose.") (citation
omitted).
159 Id. at 1350.
160 603 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1979).
161 McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350 (quoting Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 420).
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religious purpose,"' 62 and United States v. Anderson, which it read as
upholding a Hobbs Act conviction of an anti-abortion activist for
threatening a doctor to induce him to cease performing abortions.'
6 3
The result in McMonagle highlights the consequences of the ex-
panded meaning of extortion. Regarding the first change, the court
found that "intangible property" interests, like "tangible property" in-
terests, are protected by the Hobbs Act. That intangible property in-
terests are sufficient for the purposes of the Hobbs Act is not
problematic of itself. If the protesters were in the business of provid-
ing women's services and attempted to secure the business of the
Center for their own clinic, the application of the Hobbs Act and
RICO would be straightforward. Alternatively, if they were trying to
secure the business for some third-party clinic, that too would fall
squarely within the controlling precedent.
The court's opinion did not, however, discuss the second
change-the change in the requirement of "obtaining." Nor did the
court squarely face, distinguish, or overrule Nedley or Sweeney. The
court did not, in fact, expressly decide that the defendants had "ob-
tained" anything.
The court's silence is perplexing for several reasons. First, the
main support for the court's argument comes from an extortion case
in which someone did indeed "get" the property extorted. Second,
the language from that case does not support the proposition that
"obtaining" requires only a "deprivation" and not a "getting" as well.
That "a person may violate the Hobbs Act without himself receiving
the benefits of his coercive actions" 64 means only that the extortionist
himself need not receive the benefits of the extortion, not that a "get-
ting" and a "depriving," as opposed to just a "depriving," need not
both occur. Finally, nowhere in its opinion did the court recognize
the New York law or common law roots of Hobbs Act extortion or its
character as a larceny-type offense, as it had in both Nedley and Swee-
ney-the controlling precedents. Had the court done so, it would
have had to admit that because extortionate "obtaining" requires both
a "getting" and a "deprivation," the defendants' actions did not consti-
tute extortion. It therefore would have had to overturn the trial court
verdict. Because it did not, though, the protesters' coercive actions
162 Id. (quoting United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir. 1975)).
163 Id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983)). As dis-
cussed supra, however, the record in Anderson included evidence that the victim, a
doctor who performed abortions, was actually extorted of $300. It is not surprising
that the McMonagle court failed to recognize this fact; the Seventh Circuit apparently
only noted the fact in passing. See supra note 126.
164 McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350.
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(i.e., pressuring the clinic to close its doors and thus to alter its behav-
ior to its detriment through the use of threats) proved sufficient to
make them liable under civil RICO.
2. NOW v. Scheidler
165
Three years after McMonagle, a similar case came before the Sev-
enth Circuit. In NOW v. Scheidler, NOW, along with two women's
health care centers that performed abortions, filed suit against a coali-
tion of anti-abortion groups known as the Pro-Life Action Network
(PLAN). PLAN's membership included Joseph Scheidler, a promi-
nent anti-abortion activist, and Operation Rescue. 16 6 The plaintiffs, in
their amended complaint, proffered various state and federal claims;
they asserted that the activities of Scheidler and PLAN-including
trespass upon and damage to clinic property, arson and attempted
arson, physical blockades of clinics, fire bombings, physical and verbal
intimidation and harassment of clinic personnel, burglaries and
thefts, and extortionate interference with contractual relations-con-
stituted a "pattern" of "racketeering activity" in violation of RICO.
x67
In analyzing the plaintiffs' RICO claims, the district court dismissed
the RICO count on the grounds that the defendants exhibited no eco-
nomic motive.' 68
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit did not reach either "property" or
"obtaining"169 under Hobbs Act extortion. It did not have to; it dis-
posed of the case at the level of the RICO claim. While Scheidler like
165 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
166 Id. at 615.
167 Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (No. 92-
780).
168 NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 944 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affid, 968 F.2d 612
(7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
169 The Seventh Circuit did state that it "agree[d] with the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of the Hobbs Act." Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629. The meaning of this state-
ment, however, is opaque. In a cryptic footnote, the court explained its
understanding of the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Hobbs Act to be that "[t] he
Hobbs Act,... which punishes obstruction of interstate commerce through extortion-
ate means, does not require that the defendant profit economically from the extor-
tion." Id. at 629 n.17. For this proposition the court cited-with no independent
analysis-McMonagle, the two decisions cited by McMonagle in its discussion of the
absence of an "economic motive" requirement in the Hobbs Act, and Town of West
Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1990)-which merely repeats
the unremarkable mantra that "[t] here is no requirement that the perpetrator of an
extortion receive the benefit of his act" and cites for that proposition a case in which
the extortioner did not seek personally to profit from his crime but instead caused his
victim to pay money to a third person. This language hardly constitutes an adoption
of the notion that for extortion, "obtain" means "deprive."
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McMonagle found that the Hobbs Act does not require an "economic
motive," unlike McMonagle, Scheidler affirmed the district court and
held that an "economic motive" was an element of RICO. Conse-
quently, the court "decline[d] to follow [McMonagle's] holding that,
in these circumstances involving a non-economic enterprise commit-
ting non-economic predicate acts, plaintiffs may invoke the provisions
of RICO.' 7
0
3. The United States Department of Justice
In 1993, the Department ofJustice (DOJ) recognized the success
that civil litigants were enjoying in pursuing RICO claims against anti-
abortion protesters using the Hobbs Act. In a letter dated October 7,
1993, and addressed to all United States Attorneys, then Acting Assis-
tant Attorney General John C. Keany advised of the availability of vari-
ous statutes for the prosecution of abortion clinic threats including,
especially, RICO and the Hobbs Act. Keany advised his readers,
"When confronted with abortion clinic threats.., in your district, you
should promptly consider the application of these statutes in deter-
mining whether there is an appropriate basis for a federal
response."'u
7
A memorandum that accompanied the letter outlined the ele-
ments of a Hobbs Act extortion violation as including "that the de-
At least two authors-including Professor G. Robert Blakey, who argued Scheidler
before the United States Supreme Court-believe that in this footnote the Seventh
Circuit addressed the "obtaining" requirement of extortion and settled the issue by
adopting its expanded form, i.e., that extortion requires only a "deprivation." See
Blakey & Roddy, supra note 17, at 1662-64 (arguing that McMonagle adopted the
expanded version of "obtaining," and that Scheidler tracked that result). A more care-
ful analysis, however, reveals that Scheidler expressly couches the footnote in terms of
its agreement with McMonagle, a case that in fact never addressed "obtaining."
McMonagle addressed only the lack of "economic motive" under the Hobbs Act. See
supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text. Moreover, the cases cited by Scheidler for
the "meaning" of the Hobbs Act derived from McMonagle are the two cases cited by
McMonagle, plus one case in which the extortionist did not act for his own personal
benefit. Consequently, the better reasoned view is that Scheidler merely adopted
McMonagle's view that "economic motive" is not an element of a Hobbs Act violation,
while rejecting McMonagle's view that "economic motive" is not an element of a RICO
violation. The court, in fact, did not reach the "obtain" versus "deprive" issue.
170 The decision, however, was later overturned on this ground. See NOW v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). Interestingly, not even the Supreme Court reached
the issue of "obtaining." See id. at 253 n.2 ("Respondents contend that petitioners are
unable to show that their actions violated the Hobbs Act .... We do not reach that
issue and express no opinion upon it.").
171 Letter from John C. Keany, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to All United
States Attorneys 2 (Oct. 7, 1993) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
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fendants induce their victims to part with property. ' 172 It underscored
that the Hobbs Act "does not require that the defendants acted to
receive, either directly or indirectly, the proceeds of the extortion or
any benefit therefrom,"1 73 and that "loss to the victim is the gravamen
of [extortion]. " 174 The memorandum also emphasized that "the
courts are generally in agreement that the Hobbs Act protects both
tangible and intangible property."
175
This analysis seriously misreads the statute and the controlling
precedent. While the extension of property within the Hobbs Act to
include intangible as well as tangible property is settled law, its combi-
nation with the changed meaning of "obtaining"-now requiring only
a "deprivation" and not a simultaneous "getting" by either the extor-
tionist or some third person-is a result without a rationale, ultimately
based on nothing more than misinterpreted dicta. The level of defer-
ence that should be afforded to an official position of the DOJ regard-
ing its interpretation of a criminal statute-especially an expansive
reading such as this-is hardly settled.1 76 Nevertheless, no court
172 United States Department of Justice, Memorandum on the Applicability of
Hobbs Act to Certain Activities of Anti-Abortion Protesters at Women's Clinics 2
(Sept. 3, 1993) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review) (emphasis added).
173 Id. at 2 (citing United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Frazier,
560 F.2d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 1977)).
174 Id. (citing United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 843 (5th Cir. 1971)).
175 Id. (citing United States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 1985), Lewis,
797 F.2d at 364, and United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1969)).
176 See NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994). Although the Court left open
the question of what deference should be afforded to the guidelines of the U.S. De-
partment ofJustice regarding statutory interpretation, it cited with approval Crandon
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Discussing the inter-
pretation of 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1986) by the Department of Justice, Justice Scalia
observed,
TheJustice Department, of course, has a very specific responsibility to deter-
mine for itself what this statute means, in order to decide when to prosecute;
but we have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with prosecuting
criminal statutes is entitled to deference.... [The] expansive administrative interpre-
tation [proposed by the Department ofJusticel of § 209 (a) is not even deserving of
any persuasive effect. Any responsible lawyer advising on whether particular
conduct violates a criminal statute will obviously err in the direction of inclu-
sion rather than exclusion-assuming, to be on the safe side, that the statute
may cover more than is entirely apparent. That tendency is reinforced when
the advice-giver is the Justice Department, which knows that if it takes an
erroneously narrow view of what it can prosecute the error will likely never
be corrected, whereas an erroneously broad view will be corrected by the
courts when prosecutions are brought. Thus, to give persuasive effect to the
Government's expansive advice-giving interpretation... would turn the normal con-
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ought to feel constrained by the DOJ's memorandum; courts should
face the issue itself on the merits.
4. Libertad v. Welch
77
A First Circuit case, Libertad demonstrates just how firmly en-
sconced in judicial lore the expanded definition of extortion is be-
coming. A group of individuals and organizations representing
women who sought or planned to seek family planning services in Pu-
erto Rico, as well as organizations who provided such services, sued
various individuals and organizations that had staged protests at plain-
tiff abortion clinics. The defendants held these protests on five differ-
ent occasions; the demonstrations involved acts of trespass upon and
damage to clinic property, physical blockades of clinics, and physical
and verbal intimidation and harassment of clinic personnel and pa-
tients.1 78 The plaintiffs claimed that these alleged acts constituted, in-
ter alia, Hobbs Act extortion as a RICO predicate.1 79 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants on all counts.
The First Circuit reinstated the RICO count. In so doing,
though, it did not address fully the elements of extortion. It reached
"property," observing that "[t]he intangible right to freely conduct
one's lawful business constitutes 'property' for purposes of [the
Hobbs Act]."180 The court did not address the question of an "eco-
nomic motive" in the Hobbs Act, nor the Act's "obtaining" require-
ment. Instead, citing no precedent at all, the court summarily
concluded,
[T] he record clearly shows that [the defendants] used force (physi-
cal obstruction, trespass, vandalism, resisting arrest), intimidation,
and harassment of clinic personnel and patients, with the specific,
uniform purpose of preventing the clinics from conducting their
normal, lawful activities. The record also amply shows that [the de-
fendants'] tactics include the intentional infliction of property dam-
struction of criminal statutes upside-down, replacing the doctrine of lenity with a doc-
trine of severity.
Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added). But see Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421, 465-66 (1986)
("Our reading of the scope of the district court's [statutory] remedial powers ... is
confirmed by the contemporaneous interpretation[] of the . . . Justice
Department.").
177 53 F.3d 428 (1st Cir. 1995).
178 &L at 433-34.
179 H at 441.
180 Id at 438 n.6 (citing Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d
1342, 1350 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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age, and directly result in the clinics' loss of business. It is difficult to
conceive a set of facts that more clearly sets forth extortion [under the
Hobbs Act].181
Thus Libertad missed a prime opportunity to explain the "obtaining"
requirement. Based on these facts, an orthodox interpretation of the
requirement would have led to an affirmation of the district court's
decision. While the clinics may have been "deprived" of "property"
under its expanded meaning, nothing in the record establishes that
any of the defendants "gote anything of which their "victims" were "de-
prived." Unhappily, like McMonagle and Scheidler, Libertad passed up
the chance to clarify the law. It now remains a holding that RICO,
through the Hobbs Act, applies to social and political protest.
5. Palmetto State Medical Center v. Operation Life Line1
8 2
In Palmetto, the plaintiff was the Palmetto State Medical Center, a
provider of gynecological services-including abortions. The plaintiff
brought suit against sixty-six individuals and two entities-Operation
Rescue and Operation Lifeline-that opposed abortion.18  The
Center claimed that during two demonstrations by the defendants at
the clinic, defendants trespassed on the Center's property, blockaded
the entrance, and prevented patients from entering the clinic. The
Center lodged a RICO count against four of the individual defendants
and Operation Rescue, claiming a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) re-
181 Id. (emphasis added). This language, however, is deceptively broad. In fact, in
a subsequent case in which a Union representative brought RICO claims against his
former employer for coercive activities similar to those involved here, the First Circuit
did not follow this line of thinking. Without referring to Libertad, the court held in
Camelio v. American Federation, 137 F.3d 666 (1st Cir. 1998) that
Camelio alleges that defendants, acting in various combination: denied him
the right to attend a union hearing; changed the means of collecting union
dues so as to put his dues in arrears and thereby deprive him of his status as
a union member; rebuffed his subsequent efforts to pay his dues; declared
him ineligible to seek office within the union and removed his name from
the ballot; and denied his repeated requests for a hearing on the issue of his
membership. Such . . . acts, though possibly unlawful on some other
grounds, do not fall under the express terms of the Hobbs Act, which pro-
hibits only "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, in-
duced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear."
Id. at 671 n.5. Perhaps, then, Libertad does not mean that the First Circuit has
adopted the expanded definition of "extortion" that also includes "coercion"; if it
does, it would be difficult to square these two decisions.
182 117 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 1997).
183 Id. at 144-45.
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suiting from multiple Hobbs Act violations. 84 The Fourth Circuit re-
versed a trial court finding of liability due to insufficient evidence.
Although the court did not address any of the elements of the Hobbs
Act, it did not question whether the Hobbs Act-and thus RICO-
might have been applicable.
185
6. United States v. Arena
8 6
While not a RICO case, a recent decision by the Second Circuit,
Arena, contains the most thorough decision by a Federal Court of Ap-
peals on the application of Hobbs Act extortion in the context of so-
cial or political protest. In fact, it is the first court of appeals opinion
directly to address the "obtaining" requirement of extortion, as well as
the "property" and "economic motive" requirements, in that context.
At trial, defendants John Arena and Michelle Wentworth were
each convicted of two counts of extortion and one count of conspiracy
to commit extortion under the Hobbs Act in connection with two bu-
tyric acid attacks on medical facilities providing abortion services.
18 7
On appeal, the defendants argued that the government's evidence
was insufficient to support Hobbs Act convictions.188
The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, addressing "prop-
erty," "economic motive," and "obtaining." Regarding "property," the
court performed a thorough analysis of the term, demonstrating how
expansively the term is currently read.189 The court agreed that plain-
tiffs' "property rights to engage in the business of providing abortion
services [free from] ... fear of future attacks" constituted a sufficient
property right for the purposes of the Hobbs Act.190 The court then
addressed, under the heading "Obtaining," both the "economic mo-
tive" and "obtaining" requirements. 191 On the question of "economic
motive," the court did no more than cite McMonagle with approval for
the proposition that "lack of economic motive does not constitute a
defense to Hobbs Act crimes."'1 2 The court then turned to the ques-
tion of "obtaining." It began by citing United States v. Clemente'93 for
184 IM at 148.
185 Id. at 148-49.
186 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999).
187 Id. at 385.
188 Id at 389.
189 See id. at 392.
190 Id. at 393.
191 See id. at 394.
192 Id. (citing Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350
(3d Cir. 1989)).
193 640 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1981).
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the proposition that "whether a Hobbs Act defendant personally re-
ceives any benefit from his alleged extortion is largely irrelevant for
the purpose of determining guilt under that Act."194 Again, this prop-
osition in itself is not problematic; in Clemente, the extortionist forced
the victim to pay money to a third person, who thus "obtained" (i.e.,
"got"), while the victim was "deprived" of, the money. The question
then turned on the definition of "obtain." Strangely, the court did
not look to the legislative history of the Hobbs Act, its New York law
heritage, or its common law roots to construe "obtain.'195 Instead, it
merely cited a Webster's Dictionary published in 1976 for the proposi-
tion that "obtaining includes 'attain [ing] ... disposal of."1 9 6 Armed
only with that definition, the court concluded,
In sum, where the property in question is the victim's right to con-
duct a business free from threats of violence and physical harm, a
person who has committed or threatened violence or physical harm
194 Arena, 180 F.3d at 394. The court also cited Town of West Hartford v. Operation
Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1990), for this proposition; however, that case
merely cites Clemente for the unremarkable mantra that "[t] here is no requirement
that the perpetrator of an extortion receive the benefit of his act." Id.
195 This approach is perplexing, as the common law and New York law back-
ground of the Hobbs Act were made known to the court. See Brief of Amicus Curiae,
The American Center for Law and Justice at 4-14, United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d
380 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1081). Curiously, the Court chose to ignore these more
complex points in favor of its simpler alternative analysis-an approach that makes
the result significantly less convincing. See LEARNED HAND, SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 131 (Dil-
lard ed. 1960) (extolling the genius ofJustice Cardozo's legal reasoning and explain-
ing how Cardozo's opinions derive their persuasive force: "[Cardozo ] never disguised
the difficulties, as lazy judges do who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen off
the table: like John Stuart Mill, he would often begin by stating the other side better
than its advocate had stated it himself").
196 Arena, 180 F.3d at 394 (citing and quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DIcrIoNAR" 1559 (1976)) (alterations in original). Again, this approach is
unorthodox. First, the court should have looked to the common law history of extor-
tion rather than to a lay dictionary to divine its meaning. Further, the Supreme Court
has opined that the relevant meaning of a word for the purposes of statutory construc-
tion is its meaning at the time a statute is enacted. See, e.g, Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532 (1983) (construing
"by reason of" in section 4 of the Clayton Act, whose predecessor was originally en-
acted as section 7 of the Sherman Act: "Just as the substantive content of the Sherman
Act draws meaning from its common-law antecedents, so must we consider the contem-
porary legal context in which Congress acted when we try to ascertain the intended
scope of the private remedy created by ... § 7") (emphasis added); Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (construing "bribery": "we look to the ordinary meaning
of the term 'bribery' at the time Congress enacted the statute") (emphasis added). Thus, if
the court felt it should use a dictionary, it should have used a legal dictionary dating
from 1946 (although even a modem legal dictionary, as opposed to a 1976 lay diction-
ary, would have led to the proper result, see supra note 80).
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in order to induce abandonment of that right has ob-
tained... property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.1
97
Reading out the "getting" requirement of extortion using a mod-
em lay dictionary without looking at legislative history, let alone the
term's New York law and common law roots, is a less than careful anal-
ysis. Sadly, that approach to extortion is now binding on the Second
Circuit. Worse, because Hobbs Act extortion is a RICO predicate, its
construction opens political and social protesters in that Circuit to
massive potential liability if they trespass or commit some other minor
but wrongful act while picketing-which turns their rightful and, in
fact, constitutionally-protected protest into wrongful "extortion."
B. Analysis
With the exception of Arena, each of these cases began as a civil
dispute brought by a business claiming economic injury at the hands
of social and political protesters. Each case involved a social or polit-
ical demonstration that, in fact, exceeded constitutional protections
by acts of trespass, vandalism, or petty assault. Each was decided
under Hobbs Act extortion, and in all but Arena, extortion was used as
a predicate offense under RICO. The actions of the protesters, how-
ever, are far more accurately described as "coercion" rather than "ex-
tortion." The goal of the protesters, in short, was to put the abortion
clinics out of business. 198 By use of threats and picketing, the protes-
ters desired to restrict the abortion clinics' freedom to conduct busi-
ness. They did not seek to "get" the business of the abortion clinics
for themselves or for others; they sought only to "deprive" the clinics
of the business. Under the traditional definition of extortion, then,
their conduct does not constitute that offense since they did not "get"
anything of which the plaintiffs were "deprived," either for themselves
or others. If these actions are to be included within extortion, a court
must find that "property" includes the right to conduct a business free
from fear and threats and that "obtaining" really requires no more
than a "deprivation." That each court did not, in fact, face and re-
solve these questions' 99 using the standard techniques of legal analysis
197 Arena, 180 F.3d at 394.
198 See, e.g., NOW v. Scheidler, No. 86-C-7888, 1999 WL 571010, at *4 (N.D. Ill.July
16, 1999) ("The stated purpose of [the defendants] ... was 'to put clinics out of
business.'").
199 By way of review, (1) McMonagle adopted the expanded definition of "prop-
erty," found no "economic motive" required for extortion or RICO, but did not reach
.obtaining," see supra notes 154-63, (2) Scheidler did not reach "property," found no
"economic motive" required for extortion, but found an "economic motive" required
for RICO (a point which the Supreme Court reversed), and did not reach "ob-
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mandated by the Supreme Court is a matter that these courts should
reconsider-or, alternatively, the Supreme Court should review these
decisions.
No one quarrels with using the criminal or civil process to deal
with unlawful protests-that is, those protests that cross the line be-
tween picketing and trespass. Traditionally, however, these petty of-
fenses are matters for state police courts; all that is involved are petty
fines, days in jail, and civil injunctions. The Hobbs Act, in contrast,
with or without RICO, is a federal felony. With RICO, massive sanc-
tions are authorized-including forfeiture of property, treble dam-
ages, and opponents' costs and counsel fees. Society can ill afford to
raise the stakes in these matters that touch First Amendment free-
doms through the covert encroachment of the judiciary. If the crimi-
nal law is to be expanded in this way, Congress is the proper body to
do so.
V. THE SUBSUMPTION OF EXTORTION BY COERCION Is NOT AN
"ABORTION" ISSUE
At this point, a brief pause for perspective is in order. In all five
of the decisions detailed in the previous section, courts used either
RICO with the Hobbs Act or the Hobbs Act alone to silence anti-abor-
tion protesters. In reality, anti-abortion protesters are merely a small
subset of all political or social protesters, making the RICO and the
Hobbs Act equally powerful against any other member of the set.
Sadly, because anti-abortion protesters were the first group to face suit
under RICO and the Hobbs Act, the courts-and others-may see the
expansion of extortion solely as an abortion issue. Consequently,
courts might occasionally abandon judicial restraint to reach the
"right" outcome rather than perform the requisite historical analysis,
thereby further distorting the issues involved. Two recent decisions
from the Second Circuit may well illustrate this disturbing point.
On June 9, 1999, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in United
States v. Jackson.200 Autumn Jackson claimed to be the daughter of
celebrity Bill Cosby, and she threatened to reveal her relationship to
taining," see supra notes 169-70, (3) Libertad adopted the expanded definition of
"property," but did not explicitly reach either "economic motive" for extortion or
"obtaining" (its holding that the facts constitute extortion includes both of these
points implicitly, though), see supra notes 180-81, (4) Palmetto did not reach any of the
four elements, see supra note 185, and (5) Arena, the only pure Hobbs Act decision,
adopted the expanded definition of "property," found no "economic motive" re-
quired for extortion, and adopted the expanded definition of "obtaining," see supra
notes 189-97.
200 180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Cosby to the media if he did not pay her $40 million.20 1 At trial,Jack-
son and an accomplice, Jose Medina, were convicted on three counts
of extortion.202 On appeal they argued, inter alia, that the district
court gave an erroneous jury charge on the elements of extortion as
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) because "it omitted any instruction
that, in order to convict, the jury must find that the threat to injure
Cosby's reputation was 'wrongful."' 20 3 The Second Circuit, in an
opinion byJudge Amalya L. Kearse, agreed with the defendants' argu-
ment. The court reversed the convictions against Jackson and Me-
dina, and it remanded the case for a new trial.204 The court admitted
that 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) does not contain the word "wrongful."20
5
Nonetheless, it did not stop with this purely textual analysis; instead, it
appealed to the history of the Hobbs Act for an understanding of the
term extortion in § 875(d), as the predecessors of both were enacted
contemporaneously.20 6 The court then observed that the definition
of extortion in the Hobbs Act was derived from New York Law, which
did contain a "wrongfulness" requirement. 20 7 Next, the court turned
to the common law roots of extortion, which also included a require-
ment of "wrongfulness." It cited Morissette v. United States2°8 for the
proposition that
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated
the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presuma-
bly knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and
the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be
taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a depar-
ture from them.
20 9
201 Id. at 60-62.
202 See id. at 64. The defendants were not convicted under the Hobbs Act. In-
stead, they were convicted on the following three counts: (1) conspiracy to violate 18
U.S.C. § 875(d) (1994), and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (3) (1994), in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); (2) interstate transmission of threats to injure another
person's reputation with the intent to extort money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
875(d) (1994); and (3) interstate travel to promote extortion, as prohibited by
§ 875(d) (1994), and the New York State extortion statute, N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 155.05(2) (e) (v) (McKinney 1988), in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
1952(a) (3). Id.
203 Id- at 64-65.
204 Id. at 76.
205 Id. at 66.
206 See id. at 68.
207 Id. at 69 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 850 (Consol. 1930)).
208 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
209 Jackson, 180 F.3d at 69 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263).
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After examining the common law and the history behind the
Hobbs Act, the court read a "wrongfulness" requirement into the
facially silent provision of § 875(d) .210
Jackson arrived at a correct result, and its approach was generally
unremarkable. Jackson is interesting, however, because it contrasts
sharply with United States v. Arena.211 Handed down on June 7, 1999
(only two days before Jackson) and authored by the same judge that
penned Jackson, the Arena decision also dealt with the Hobbs Act. Un-
like in Jackson, however, in Arena the Hobbs Act was applied to anti-
abortion protesters. Also unlike in Jackson, the court in Arena did not
look to the New York law or the common law history of the Hobbs Act
in interpreting the statute. Rather, it used a 1976 lay dictionary to
expand extortion, reading out the "getting" requirement and requir-
ing only a "deprivation. '212 The approach of the same judge to extor-
tion in each case was, therefore, radically different.
How the same judge, in cases decided only two days apart, can
analyze extortion in such markedly different ways is not apparent
from the text of the opinions. In fact, the only readily apparent dis-
tinction between the two cases is that one involved a celebrity while
the other involved anti-abortion protesters; otherwise, both were rou-
tine extortion prosecutions. Yet, the same judge carefully sifted
through the legislative and common law history of extortion in the
Hobbs Act to import a "wrongfulness" requirement into an otherwise
silent statute, but ignored that history completely when construing "ob-
tain," a word that did appear in the statute. Because Judge Kearse-
whose reputation is that of one of the most able persons sitting on the
Second Circuit-never offers a reason for her wholly different ap-
proaches, and no such reason is apparent on the face of the decisions,
perhaps the two decisions simply cannot be squared.
Even if some people might be tempted to applaud the judicial
morphing of the Hobbs Act's "obtaining" requirement to sanction
anti-abortion protesters, they should pause to consider the implica-
tions of this new form of extortion for all social and political protes-
ters. Nothing in the language of the statute limits its applicability to
anti-abortion protesters. Rather, anyone who wants to silence any so-
cial or political protest can draw and wield the RICO/Hobbs Act
weapon created by the expansion of Hobbs Act extortion.
210 Id. at 70.
211 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999). For a complete discussion of this case, see supra
Part IV.A.6.
212 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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Two businesses have, in fact, used this weapon to silence protes-
ters who demonstrated against something wholly unrelated to abor-
tion-cruelty to animals. In 1997 Huntington Life Sciences, a New
Jersey-based vivisection laboratory, brought suit against People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) over PETA's demonstrations at
the laboratory.213 And this past summer the owners of Ferber Furs, a
fur showroom in Philadelphia, filed a RICO claim against animal
fights activists who had demonstrated outside their store.2 14 In short,
the illegitimate judicial expansion of the Hobbs Act is not an abortion
issue. It is an issue of First Amendment freedoms, and more specifi-
cally, of the fight to social and political demonstration.
VI. Tim FIRST AMENDMENT
A. What the First Amendment Protects
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech.., or the fight of the people
peaceably to assemble." 215 Social and political protesters, therefore,
enjoy basic fights to meet and to speak their minds. The protection
afforded them applies even to "advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. 21
6
The First Amendment protects more than just speech; it also ex-
tends to other kinds of protest activities. Such activities as demonstrat-
ing,2 17 leafleting,218 and publishing and disseminating literature21 9
213 The lawsuit settled, and the terms of the settlement agreement limit disclosure
of its content. Jeffrey Kerr, General Counsel to PETA, did, however, discuss the suit
in limited detail in testimony before Congress. See Hearings on the Civil RICO Clarifica-
tion Act of 1990 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 3-8 (1998) (statement of Jeffrey S. Kerr, General Counsel to PETA) (visited
Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/35055.htm>.
214 See Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman, No. 99-CV-2277 (E.D. Pa. filed May 3,
1999); see also Michael Rubinkam, Fur Wars Between Stores, Animal Rights Activists Rage,
Ferber Coat Company Sues Protesters for Alleged Cases of Destruction of Propery, HARRSBURG
PATRIOT & EVENING NEws, Jun. 20, 1999, at A4.
215 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
216 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
217 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)
(striking down an ordinance governing the issuance of parade permits because it gave
police officials too much discretion in determining who could demonstrate).
218 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (striking down a stat-
ute which prohibited all leafleting and picketing on a sidewalk adjoining the U.S.
Supreme Court building); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (striking
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are within its safe harbor. Marches and demonstrations are also quin-
tessential First Amendment activities; 220 so, too, is picketing,221 which
is not unlawful even if picketers encourage others to take action that is
harmful to the target of the picketing.222 Likewise the First Amend-
ment protects the right to show visual representations223 and to en-
gage in symbolic conduct-such as burning the American flag.224
Obnoxious and harassing speech is also protected,225 as is speech that
attempts to persuade others to action.226 Even coercive speech is pro-
tected: the Supreme Court has specifically held that speech "does not
down several ordinances that prohibited leafleting on public streets and in other pub-
lic places).
219 See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943) (finding distribution of
handbills to pedestrians on a public street protected by the First Amendment).
220 See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (finding a march
and demonstration protected by the First Amendment).
221 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (striking down a statute
which prohibited the picketing of residences or dwellings except when the dwelling
was used as a place of business, was a place of employment involved in a labor dispute
or the place of holding a meeting on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of
general public interest); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (striking down
an ordinance which banned all picketing within 150 feet of a school building while
classes were in session and one half-hour before and afterwards except the peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute); cf Clayton, supra note 4, at 994.
Clayton argued,
Picketing, leafleting, and other forms of advocacy-the classic tools of social
protest movements-were never a part of the Scheidler case. The plaintiffs
never claimed that speech, even the ugly speech that the defendants used-
calling the patients, staff and volunteers "murderers," and "baby killers"-
was a RICO violation. The plaintiffs recognized that unpleasant speech is an
important part of the free speech protected by the First Amendment. For
this reason, the defendants' threats that abortion providers and recipients
would "go to hell" played no role in the extortion for which they were sued.
Id. Of course, the "go to hell" threats might be hard to litigate in any event, unless
one is prepared to name God as a RICO defendant. Nevertheless, while the question
of whether the activities mentioned herein ultimately led to defendants' liability in
Scheidler is unclear-as the jury returned only a general verdict-this statement by
plaintiff's counsel in that case strongly indicates that even plaintiffs in RICO litigation
against political protesters whose activities cross the protected boundary understand
the value of First Amendment freedoms.
222 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). But see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 488 (1988) (upholding a town ordinance prohibiting focused picketing at an
individual house).
223 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
224 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
225 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.").
226 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
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lose its protected character simply because it may embarrass others or
coerce them into action."227
Moreover, these rights apply equally to individuals qua individu-
als as to individuals qua members of a group. Freedom of assembly
and association are integral parts of the First Amendment's
guarantees. 22
8
The First Amendment does not protect all organized protest ac-
tivity; the Supreme Court has upheld limitations on such activity. Re-
strictions as to time, place, and manner may be acceptable when
necessary to protect the public.229 Such limitations must not, how-
ever, restrict the content or form of the expression.2 0 The Court has
enforced two sets of standards in the review of time, place, and man-
ner restrictions. First, the Court has held that
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the con-
stitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
231
Second, the Court has held that such restrictions are constitu-
tional when they "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
227 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982); see also id. at 921
("To the extent that the court's judgment rests on the ground that 'many' black citi-
zens were 'intimidated' by 'threats' of 'social ostracism, vilification, and traduction,' it
is flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972) ("[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); Organ-
ization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("The claim that the
expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on [a realtor] does not re-
move them from the reach of the First Amendment."); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 708 (1969) ("The language of the political arena.., is often vituperative,
abusive, and inexact."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965) ("[A] function
of free speech.., is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest.., or even stirs people to anger.") (citations omit-
ted); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (recognizing a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide open").
228 See NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recog-
nized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly.")
229 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
230 See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-12 (1975).
231 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication."23 2 As the Court has observed, the two
variations of the standard for determining the validity of time, place,
and manner restrictions are essentially the same.23 3 Thus, the First
Amendment does not protect violent acts. 23 4 Nor does it protect tres-
pass.23 5 Unauthorized entry constitutes trespass, and it will not re-
ceive First Amendment protection.236 Similarly, blocking access to
property, be it private or public, is not protected by the First
Amendment.
237
B. The Risk to First Amendment Freedoms Posed by the
RICO/Hobbs Act Weapon
Determining where the boundary between protected and unpro-
tected activity under the First Amendment lies in the context of a so-
cial or political protest is a difficult task. On the one hand, protesters
232 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Ed. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
233 See, e.g., F.W./P.B.S., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 244 (1990) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ("The First
Amendment does not protect violence."); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
116 (1972) (holding that violent demonstrations lose First Amendment protection);
see also RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 & n.1 (1992) (finding cross burning
punishable as arson, criminal damage to property, and a terrorist threat while striking
down a city ordinance prohibiting cross burning and other behavior "which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" (quoting St. Paul Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIs. CODE § 292.02 (1990))).
235 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976) (admonishing that the First
Amendment does not protect the right of free speech against limitations imposed by
"action by the owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private pur-
poses only" (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))); see also Town
of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 383 (D. Conn. 1989) ("[A]
bright line is crossed at the threshold of private property."), vacated on other grounds by
Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990).
236 As noted above, in McMonagle, the court affirmed the liability of defendants
who had entered the clinic's facilities without authorization. See Northeast Women's
Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
237 See Cameron v.Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (upholding law prohibiting
picketing that "obstructs or unreasonably interferes with ingress or egress to or from a
courthouse"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) ("A group of demonstrators
could not insist upon the right to cordon off... [an] entrance to a public building,
and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations."); see also
NewYork State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1364 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[Blllocking access
to public and private buildings has never been upheld as a proper method of commu-
nication in an orderly society.").
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engaged in pure political or social speech no doubt fall within the
protections of the First Amendment, while on the other hand, those
engaged in purely criminal conduct just as surely are not protected.
Protests that involve elements of both protected and unprotected
speech, however, present more difficult issues. In this nebulous area
of hybrid activity, composed of both protected and unprotected activ-
ity, lurks the potential for the abrogation of protected freedoms in the
name of reaching unprotected behavior. When the tool of prosecu-
tion is RICO with Hobbs Act extortion predicates, the stakes are at
their highest.
Extortion, under the expanded judicial interpretation, occurs
when the perpetrator deprives another of his property, tangible or
intangible. But suppose, for example, a protest group peacefully pick-
ets and distributes leaflets for months or even years outside a business,
but sometimes its members block access to the clinic's driveways or
doors or (rarely) injure its clients.238 Suppose further that the group's
protest activities against the business eventually succeed, driving it out
of business. Under this scenario, a finding that "extortionate" activity
caused the business economic loss runs the substantial risk of sanc-
tioning the protesters for conduct that was, in fact, protected. Protes-
ters engaging in protected activity risk losing their protected status
when later they or others with whom they are associated engage in
unprotected acts, since the line between protected and unprotected
activities is fuzzy. The effect is a chilling of free speech.
The Supreme Court and various authors have observed that "chil-
ling" free speech is undesirable. One author (who is also the Legisla-
tive Counsel for the ACLU) explained,
[T]he harm caused by the chilling of free speech is comparatively
greater than the harm resulting from the chilling of other activi-
ties .... [Therefore,] [t]he logical mandate of the chilling effect
doctrine is that legal rules should be formulated to allocate the risk
238 This hypothetical mirrors the activities of the protesters in NOW v. Scheidler,
510 U.S. 249 (1994), as explained by Fay Clayton, Counsel for Plaintiff in that case:
Abortion opponents who protested outside the clinics ran the gamut from
lawful protesters who prayed, sang, and passed out leaflets, to lawful but ob-
noxious protesters who screamed "murderer" and "baby-killer," to outright
thugs who physically assaulted the women and the clinic escorts and barri-
caded the doors. While the first two types of protests are, of course, pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the third is noL
Clayton, supra note 4, at 971.
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of error away from the preferred value, thereby minimizing the oc-
currence of the most harmful errors.
239
With prescience, the ACLU commented in 1989 that RICO's "po-
tential for chilling First Amendment rights of expression is enor-
mous. '240 Peaceful protesters will be afraid to engage in protected
protest for fear of facing a RICO suit despite being protected by the First
Amendment. Such fear is understandable. First, RICO provides for sig-
nificant sanctions (treble damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys'
fees).241 Second, the stigmatic label of "racketeer" affixes to anyone
against whom a RICO claim is brought-even if that person's First
Amendment rights are ultimately vindicated. 242 A particular social or
protest movement can thus be delegitimized by its association through
RICO with mafia dons and Wall Street swindlers. Third, the intrusive
discovery proceedings that follow the mere filing of a suit hold damag-
ing potential for social or political protest groups. A well-pleaded
RICO complaint gives plaintiffs the right to depose individuals and
call for the production of documents. 243 Moreover, because the
pleading requirements for a RICO and Hobbs Act claim sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss are minimal, individual protesters might
well have to bear the enormous costs of litigation (the detailed discov-
ery244-necessary in most types of civil litigation-would impose
crushing costs on protesters) even if their protests are fully-protected
239 Califa, supra note 17, at 833; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997)
(finding the provisions of the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional, the
Court observed that "It]he vagueness of [the] ... regulation.... coupled with its
increased deterrent effect as a criminal statute .... raises special First Amendment
concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech"); Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 156 (1969) (concluding that protest marchers had
good reason to fear legal liability even though their actions were protected by the
First Amendment; it "would have taken extraordinary clairvoyance" for protest march-
ers to predict a narrowing construction of parade ordinance); cf Frederick Schauer,
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685,
688 (1978) (arguing that the doctrine of "chilling effect may be seen not as the non-
conceptual generalization ... but rather as a specific substantive doctrine lying at the
very heart of the first amendment") (footnote omitted).
240 Rorie Sherman, Courts Deal Blockaders Big Setbacks, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 13, 1989, at
30, 32 (quoting Antonio Califa, Legislative Counsel for the ACLU, Washington, D.C.)
(citation omitted).
241 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. III 1997).
242 See Mike Robinson, Racketeer Verdict Angers Opponents of Abortion, Sets Stage for
More Claims, BuALo NEWS, Apr. 21, 1998, at A6 (quoting Joseph Scheidler: "We
wanted to come out as a legitimate force in America and not as racketeers. There is
no honor in being a racketeer and we're not racketeers").
243 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5).
244 See id.
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by the First Amendment.245 Finally, overbreadth,246 vagueness,2 47 and
245 See Editorials Free to Protest-Without Violence, ATLANTAJ. CONST., Apr. 23, 1998,
at A22 (quotingJoseph Scheidiler on how a finding of RICO liability would change his
protest activities: "We're still going to be at the abortion mills ... but in a more
prayerful spirit"); cf NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 264 (1994) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (recognizing that "entities engaging in vigorous but fully protected expression
might.., be... exposed to harassing RICO suits"). Protesters simply won't know
which acts-if indeed any at all are required beyond association-might subject them
to liability. See Cam Simpson, NOW Aims to Apply Victory Nationwide, CHICAGO SUN-
TiMEs, Apr. 22, 1998 at 10 (quoting Joseph Scheidler who, after being found liable
under RICO for protest activities, stated "I think they're taking away our First Amend-
ment rights. What if you have already written a pamphlet that suggests blockades are
not a bad idea? Would that be in violation of [RICO]?").
246 A statute is "overbroad" if in addition to prohibiting activities that may be con-
stitutionally proscribed, it also reaches activity that is protected by the First Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (stating that overbreadth
occurs when a statute, targeting unprotected activities, "sweeps within its ambit other
activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of
speech"); see also City Council v. Taxpayers for Vimcent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 & n.19
(1984) (arguing that when a statute "attaches sanctions to protected conduct, the
likelihood that the statute will deter that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to
justify an overbreadth attack" (citing Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
217 (1975))); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(comparing "overbreadth" to a "sword of Damocles"). See generally Henry Paul
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 23-39. The extent of protection of-
fered by the doctrine is, however, limited. To succeed, a First Amendment challenge
must show that the overbreadth "not only [is] real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 615 (1973); cf New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (extending the
Broadrick requirement to pure speech; upholding a state law banning child pornogra-
phy, even though the statute could also reach "some protected expression, ranging
from medical textbooks to pictorials in the National Geographic," because the "arguably
impermissible applications of the statute amount to no more than a tiny fraction of
the materials within the statute's reach").
Even under the Broadrick standard, a strong argument can be made that the
RICO/Hobbs Act combination is overbroad in its current form. The Hobbs Act
reaches many protest activities, and RICO increases the potential liability of protesters
for repeated acts of protest. Thus, when, as in McMonagle and Scheidler, see discussion,
supra Parts IVAl. & 2., these provisions are made to apply not to just to unprotected
acts, but to all acts of a protest or series of protest-including the protected acts-
once the protesters involved commit one or more unprotected acts, substantial liabil-
ity is imposed for protected as well as unprotected activity. Undeniably, when months
of peaceful picketing can become actionable after two accidental footsteps onto pri-
vate property, the impermissible applications of the statute constitute an enormous
fraction of the materials within its reach.
247 The doctrine of "vagueness" may be invoked to strike down a statute that poses
a serious threat to First Amendment freedoms. This doctrine is rooted in two differ-
ent kinds of constitutional considerations: those relating to fair notice-adequate
guidelines under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
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see U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV, and those relating to separation of powers under
Article III, see U.S. CONST., art. III.
One purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to ensure that "ascertainable standards
of guilt" are provided. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); see alsoJordan
v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) ("The essential purpose of the 'void-for-vague-
ness' doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct.")
(citations omitted). Thus, conduct may not be made criminal under a "statute sweep-
ing a great variety of conduct under a general and indefininte characterization, and
leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). The doctrine also serves a second
purpose: the corollary of fair notice to the defendant is the requirement of a guiding
standard for law enforcement. Indeed, "the more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforce-
ment.'" Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). See generally Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
629 (1984). In Roberts, the Court recognized that
[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine ... require[s] that [the] government artic-
ulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity[,] ensure[s] that state
power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger of caprice and
discrimination in the administration of the laws, enables individuals to con-
form their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningfuljudi-
cial review.
Id. (citations omitted).
A finding of First Amendment vagueness carries more significance than other
findings of vagueness: "[v] agueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges, typically produce facial invalidations, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1338
(13th ed. 1997). Thus, in determining whether a law is void for vagueness in the First
Amendment context, the following inquiries are appropriate: "(1) Does the statute in
question give fair notice to those persons potentially subject to it? (2) Does it ade-
quately guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement? and (3) Does it pro-
vide sufficient breathing space for First Amendment rights?" LAFAVE & Scorr, supra
note 70, at 92. Also, courts must read statutes not merely on their face, but in light of
any "limiting construction." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355 (citing Village of Hoffman Es-
tates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982)). This is espe-
cially the case when words have a well-settled common law meaning. See Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (citing Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376
(1913)).
The present state of the RICO/Hobbs Act combination is vague in the context of
the First Amendment. Since protected protest can become unprotected simply be-
cause of later unprotected activity, protesters do not have proper notice concerning
the liability to which they may be subject. Moreover, under the expanded definition
of extortion-unlike under the normal common law understanding of the term-
protesters are subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; protesters who
participate in weeks, months, or years of protected conduct can be held liable for that
conduct if, the following day, they engage in unprotected conduct. This risk of un-
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the possibility of improperly imposing vicarious liability248 exacerbate
the chilling effect of the combination of RICO and the Hobbs Act, a
formidable weapon in its expanded form. The threat of RICO and
Hobbs Act suits under the present approach, then, necessarily chills
constitutionally protected free speech.
foreseen liability for otherwise protected acts does not leave sufficient breathing space
for the vigorous exercise of First Amendment rights. This vagueness would be cor-
rected by hewing to the traditional, common law construction of the term-a far
more limited construction than that of expanded extortion.
248 The provisions of RICO impose liability on both principals and conspirators.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d) (1994). Also, because RICO is a part of Title 18, § 2
imposes liability on persons who aid and abet in its violation; a person who willfully
causes an act to be performed "which if directly performed by him or another would
be an offense against the United States" will incur liability as a principal. See id. § 2(b)
(1994). Thus, RICO may be used to hold leaders and advocates of protests responsi-
ble for their agents' activities. See, e.g., Cam Simpson, Judge Clamps Down on Abortion
Proests, Cm. SuN-TmEs, Jul. 17, 1999, at 8 (reporting on an order issued against Jo-
seph Scheidler and others, stemming from a case in which they were found guilty of
RICO violations via Hobbs Act predicate offenses; the order banned them from "'in-
ducing, directing or inciting' their followers to obstruct abortion clinics under a na-
tionwide injunction"). Moreover, RICO's conspiracy liability can be very broad. The
Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant need only agree to participate in the af-
fairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity rather than specifically
agree to commit personally any predicate act. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S.
52, 63 (1997). Political protesters could therefore be liable as conspirators under
RICO, even if they agreed only to participate indirectly in the illegitimate objectives of
the enterprise, and did not agree personally to commit the predicate acts.
First Amendment jurisprudence, however, demands a stricter standard. Under
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), the state must prove that (1) the
speaker subjectively intended incitement, (2) in context, the words used were likely to
produce imminent, lawless action, and (3) the words used by the speaker objectively
encouraged and urged such lawless action. Moreover, as explained in NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982), "[t]he right to associate does not lose all
constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may have par-
ticipated in conduct... that itself is not protected." Instead, those who "assist in the
conduct of [meetings for peaceable political action] cannot be branded as criminals
on that score." Id. (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). Rather,
"[f] or liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish
that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific
intent to further those illegal aims." Id. at 920. Thus, the extended use of RICO
against those who are not principals in the first degree allowed by the expanded
Hobbs Act is inconsistent with established First Amendment jurisprudence.
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C. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.:2 49 The Correct Way to Apply
the RICO and Hobbs Act Provisions in the Context of Political Protest, But
Not the Complete Answer
1. The Lesson of Claiborne Hardware
Claiborne Hardware holds great potential for clarifying how to har-
monize RICO and the First Amendment in the context of political
demonstrators. In that case, which grew out of a seven year boycott
organized by the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), seventeen white merchants filed suit for
malicious interference with trade against Charles Evers (the field sec-
retary of the NAACP in Mississippi and a principal organizer of the
boycott), Mississippi Action for Progress (MAP), Aaron Henry (Presi-
dent of the Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP), the NAACP
itself, and 144 other individuals.2 50 The purpose of the boycott was to
secure equality and racial justice. 251 Unfortunately, the boycott was
marred with instances of violence: shots were fired into people's
homes, bricks were thrown through windows, and a "violator" of the
boycott was publicly whipped.25 2 At trial Evers, principally based on
his public speeches, and the NAACP, for whom he worked, were held
responsible for all business lost by the merchants during the seven-
year period.2 55 In all, 130 of the 148 defendants originally named
were found jointly and severally liable for these damages.2 54 On ap-
peal, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the defendants' reliance
on the First Amendment, stating,
The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats against the
peace to achieve a goal makes the present state of facts a conspiracy.
We know of no instance, and our attention has been drawn to no
decision, wherein it has been adjudicated that free speech guaran-
teed by the First Amendment includes in its protection the right to
commit crime.
25 5
Without dissent, the Supreme Court reversed the decision.
25 6
The Court found that the non-violent conduct was privileged by the
249 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
250 Id. at 889-90.
251 Id. at 899-900.
252 Id. at 904-05.
253 Id. at 893.
254 Id.
255 393 So.2d 1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980). The Court did, however, overturn the lia-
bility finding with respect to 38 of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs at
trial "did not establish their case" with respect to those defendants. Id. at 1302.
256 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 886.
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First Amendment and could not be made the basis of suit,25 7 even
though the means employed included social pressure and coercion.
25 8
The Court thus refused to impose blanket liability for all acts in the
boycott just because some were violent and thus unprotected. In-
stead, it instructed that, in deciding which conduct is compensable "in
the context of constitutionally protected activity,... precision of regula-
tion is demanded."259 This "precision of regulation" requires courts,
in jury instructions and verdicts, to determine which specific acts
within a general protest were protected and which were unpro-
tected-since only specific damage proximately caused by unlawful
(and thus unprotected) conduct may be remedied.260 Or, in the
Court's words, "Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful con-
duct may be recovered."
261
Recognizing that this showing of proximate causation is not an
easy task, the Court observed,
[I] t is of prime importance that no constitutional freedom, least of
all guarantees of the Bill of Rights, be defeated by insubstantial find-
ings of fact screening reality .... [T]he right of free speech cannot
be denied by drawing from a trivial rough incident or a moment of
animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peaceful picket-
ing has the taint of force. 262
Consequently, the Court concluded,
The burden of demonstrating that [the taint of violence that
colored some acts] colored the entire collective effort ... is not
satisfied by evidence that violence occurred or even that violence
257 Id. at 911-15. The Court stated,
[T~he boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity... [and]
[w]hile States have broad power to regulate economic activity, we do not
find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that
found in the boycott in this case.... We hold that the nonviolent elements
of petitioners' activities are entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment.
Id.
258 Id. at 910 ("Speech does not lose its protected character... simply because it
may embarrass others or coerce them into action."); cf. id ("The First Amendment is
a charter for government, not for an institution of learning. 'Free trade in ideas'
means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe
facts." (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945))).
259 Id. at 916 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)) (emphasis
added).
260 See id. at 917-18.
261 IM at 918.
262 Id- at 924 (quoting Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 293 (1941)).
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contributed to the success of the boycott. A massive and prolonged
effort to change the social, political, and economic structure of a
local environment cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy
simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of relatively few
violent acts.... The burden of demonstrating that fear rather than
protected conduct was the dominant force in the movement is
heavy. A court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest
is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage
of countless freestanding trees.
2 63
The Court further opined that, in the context of political protest,
the First Amendment mandates that individual liability generally be
based on individual conduct.2 64 Consequently, mere membership in a
group that commits unlawful activities cannot itself lead to liability. If
individual liability is to be based on group conduct, it must be estab-
lished that the alleged group possessed unlawful goals,265 that the in-
dividual knowingly joined the alleged group,266 and that the
individual held a specific intent to further its unlawful objectives.
267
Claiborne Hardware addresses many of the problems posed by pro-
test activity. Certainly, political and social protesters like the NAACP
or Joseph Scheidler, who seek not economic gain but social change,
attempt to coerce or socially pressure businesses to stop engaging in
certain practices-if not to drive them from the market entirely. But
Claiborne Hardware teaches that this, without more, is insufficient to
render otherwise protected speech unprotected. Moreover, under
263 Id. at 933. But see id. at 923 n.64 (noting, as a caveat, that if "'special
facts... appeared in an action for damages after picketing marred by violence had
occurred,' they might "'support the conclusion that all damages resulting from the
picketing were proximately caused by its violent component or by the fear which that
violence engendered'" (quoting Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 731-32 (1966)
and citing Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, as an example of a case with such special
facts).
264 Id. at 918 ("The First Amendment... restricts the ability of the State to impose
liability on an individual solely because of his association with another.").
265 Id. at 920 ("For liability to be imposed by association alone, it is necessary to
establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals.").
266 Id. at 919-20 ("The government has the burden of establishing a knowing affil-
iation with [the] organization .... " (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186
(1972))).
267 Id. at 920. The Court instructed,
Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to
a group, some members of which committed acts of violence. For liability to
be imposed by association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent
to further those illegal alms.
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Claiborne Hardware, a court must examine the individual acts involved
in a protest with "precision of regulation," separating the unprotected
acts from the protected acts and imposing individual liability based on
individual conduct only for protesters who commit unprotected acts.
Thus, under Claiborne Hardware the jury in Scheidler, for example,
should have been required to examine all acts that occurred in the
fifteen years of protest activity. Then, it should have been required to
separate unprotected acts (on which liability can be based) from pro-
tected acts (which cannot be reached), instead of just returning a
blanket verdict finding that, in sum, all of the defendants' acts-pro-
tected or otherwise-generally constituted "extortion." Further,
under Claiborne Hardware those who join a protest but do not them-
selves engage in violent acts cannot be found liable for damages-
unless they knowingly joined a group with unlawful goals and held a
specific intent to further those goals. This protects people who, like
some of the protesters who marched with Scheidler, do not engage in
unprotected conduct, but belong to or associate with a group, one or
more of whose members do engage in unprotected conduct. Conse-
quently, the "precision of regulation" and the vicarious liability stan-
dard mandated by Claiborne Hardware relieve from liability protesters
who, while members of or associated with a protest movement, do not
engage in unprotected acts or consciously seek to further any unlawful
goals of the organization.
2. Claiborne Hardware Is Not a Panacea
Claiborne Hardware is undoubtedly useful in addressing cases in
which the RICO/Hobbs Act combination and the First Amendment
collide. However, Claiborne Hardware represents the bare minimum
that should be done when addressing such issues. It does not resolve
all of the problems created by expanded extortion.
First, while as yet no Supreme Court majority decision has di-
rectly addressed whether and how the First Amendment applies in
RICO/Hobbs Act suits against political protesters, 268 in a separate
concurrence to the Scheidler decision 269 Justices Souter and Kennedy
suggested that the First Amendment considerations in such cases are
properly considered as a defense to be analyzed on the facts of each
case. 270 Specifically, Justice Souter observed that alleged violations of
268 Scheidler came the closest; however, the majority declined to decide the issue.
See NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 n.6 (1994).
269 See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 263.
270 iL at 264 (SouterJ., concurring). Civil liberties advocates were justifiably con-
cerned that the other seven Justices did not feel this clarification significant enough
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the Hobbs Act or one of the other "somewhat elastic RICO predicate
acts" might be defeated as barred by the First Amendment, entitling a
defendant to dismissal.2 71 Alternatively, he noted, "[W] here a RICO
violation has been otherwise validly established, the First Amendment
may limit the relief that can be granted against an organization other-
wise engaging in protected expression. '272 This approach might solve
the problems of overbreadth, as RICO with Hobbs Act predicates
would not extend to protected acts of political protesters. It would
also help to avoid the improper imposition of group liability, and
might go a long way towards clearing up the vagueness problem by
clarifying exactly which protest activities could be sanctioned under
RICO with Hobbs Act predicates. It would not, however, solve the
compelling problem of the chilling effect; if the role of the First
Amendment is limited to that of an affirmative defense, and it is not
considered in statutory construction itself, opponents can still file
RICO claims that will survive a motion to dismiss. The threat of such a
suit, as well as the costs it would entail, is enough to chill protected
protest activity. The fact that potential protesters might prevail-as
they should-only after expending substantial sums of time and
money on a full trial on the merits would almost certainly discourage
potential protesters from fully exercising their rights.
273
to join in the concurrence. See Harvey Silvergate, Court's Double Standard, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1994, at 11.
271 Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 264 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 917 (1982) and holding that a state common law prohi-
bition on malicious interference with business could not, under the circumstances, be
constitutionally applied to a civil-rights boycott of white merchants).
272 Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and invali-
dating, on First Amendment grounds, a court order compelling production of the
NAACP's membership lists issued to enforce Alabama's requirements for out-of-state
corporations doing business in the state).
273 If followed, however, another line of cases could remedy this deficiency in Clai-
borne Hardware by requiring heightened pleading for cases where the pendancy of the
action itself threatens to chill First Amendment freedoms. Justice Souter recognized
this possibility in his concurrence in NOWv. Scheidler. See NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S.
249, 264-65 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment may limit the
relief that can be granted against an organization otherwise engaging in protected
expression" (citing, inter alia, Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d
531 (9th Cir. 1991))). Although Justice Souter neglected to identify the root of this
line of cases, the seminal case is Franchise Realty v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976). That decision states,
[I]n any case, whether antitrust or something else, where a plaintiff seeks
damages or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct which is prima facie pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the danger that the mere pendency of the
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Second, despite the status of Claiborne Hardware as binding prece-
dent, two major cases, McMonagle274 and Scheidler,275 ignored its in-
struction in assessing liability for RICO and Hobbs Act violations in
action will chill the exercise of First Amendment rights requires more spe-
cific allegations than would otherwise be required.
Id. at 1082-83. In fact, courts in all but two circuits (the Fourth and the Fifth) have
adopted the rule of Franchise Realty. See Federal Prescription Serv. v. American
Pharm. Assoc., 471 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1979), affd on other grounds, 663 F.2d
253 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Cash Energy v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 899 (D. Mass. 1991);
Caplan v. American Baby, 582 F. Supp. 869, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (copyright and trade-
mark); WIXT Television v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1003, 1035 (N.D.N.Y. 1980);
Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 497 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (D. Del. 1980);
Realco Servs. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Miller & Son Paving v.
Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n., 443 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (E.D. Pa.), afld on other
grounds, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1978); Bethlehem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966,
971 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F. Supp. 702, 705-06
(E.D. Mich. 1992); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
627 F. Supp. 957, 966 (N.D. M11. 1985), rev'd sub nom on other grounds, Premier Elec.
Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Assoc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987); Mark
Aero v. Trans World Airlines, 580 F.2d 288, 297 (8th Cir. 1978); Kottle v. Northwest
Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998); Oregon Natural Resources Council
v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1991); Hydro-Tech. Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp.,
673 F.2d 1171, 1177 n.8 (10th Cir. 1982); Spanish Int'l Communications Corp. v.
Leibowitz, 608 F. Supp. 178, 182-84 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 778 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.
1985); St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Auth., 620 F. Supp. 814, 833 & n.22 (S.D. Ga.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 795 F.2d 948 (1986); Gainesville v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1266-67 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
Because RICO and the antitrust laws are in pari materia, the rule in Franchise Re-
alty should apply to RICO as well. Thus, if courts faithfully applied both Franchise
Realty and Claiborne Hardware, the heightened particularity in pleading, jury instruc-
tions, and verdicts that these decisions together require might well prevent the use of
RICO against protected First Amendment political and social protest.
274 See Califa, supra note 17, at 840. Califa wrote,
In McMonagle RICO resulted in an 887 dollar judgment turning into a nearly
68,000 dollarjudgment Twelve trespassed when somebody damaged prop-
erty. Only those demonstrators who were involved in violent activities
should have been held liable for the damages proximately caused. The use
of RICO destroyed the careful attempts of Claiborne Hardware to protect the
[F]irst [A]mendment in mixed conduct situations. The group of defend-
ants liable was expanded. Only twelve caused damages, but fourteen others
were held liable because they trespassed. In effect, the Court found all tres-
passers guilty of extortion. Second, Claiborne Hardware's precision of regula-
tion rule is violated in the amount of damages for which defendants are
liable. RICO mandatorily trebles damages and awards attorneys' fees, which
are otherwise unavailable. Thus, defendants who legitimately were liable for
887 dollars were held liable for nearly 68,000 dollars because of RICO. Such
a result is untenable and chills [F]irst [A]mendment rights.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
275 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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the context of political protest, resulting in enormous awards for
plaintiffs.
Furthermore, after Madsen v. Women's Health Centet, 276 it is ques-
tionable whether even the Supreme Court will be receptive to the
most iron-clad First Amendment argument.277 In Madsen, the Court
was called upon to determine the constitutionality of an injunction
restraining the demonstration activities of anti-abortion protesters
that had been upheld by the Florida Supreme Court.2 78 The injunc-
tion, among other things, prohibited the protesters from demonstrat-
ing on private or public land within thirty-six feet-of the propert", ine
of the clinic 279 and imposed noise restrictions on the protesters.2 80
As a threshold issue, the Court was asked to determine which
standard would apply to the injunction:281 strict scrutiny, the stan-
dard applied to content-based restrictions (the restriction must be
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and... narrowly drawn
to achieve that end"282 ) or intermediate scrutiny, the standard applied
to content-neutral restrictions (which allows regulations on the "time,
276 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
277 Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Decrying the Court's decision, which upheld
part of an injunction against anti-abortion demonstrators, Justice Scalia argued that
"[tihe entire injunction in this case departs so far from the established course of our
jurisprudence that in any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate
for summary reversal." Id. But in the context of abortion, Scalia observed, the rules
are different:
[N]o legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by [the
Supreme] Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involv-
ing state regulation of abortion. The permissible scope of abortion regula-
tion is not the only constitutional issue on which this Court is divided, but-
except when it comes to abortion-the Court has generally refused to let
such disagreements, however longstanding or deeply felt, prevent it from
evenhandedly applying uncontroversial legal doctrines to cases that come
before it.
Id. (quoting Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 814 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
278 Id. at 759.
279 Id. (stating that the injunction barred the protesters "[a]t all times and on all
days, from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating, or entering that por-
tion of the public right-of-way or private property within [36] feet of the property line
of the Clinic") (first alteration in original).
280 I& at 760 (stating that the injunction prohibited the protesters "[d]uring the
hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon, on Mondays through Saturdays, during surgical
procedures and recovery periods, from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling,
use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other
sounds... within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic").
281 See id. at 762.
282 Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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place, and manner" of expression so long as they "are content-neutral,
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication"283). The
Court, recognizing that injunctions "carry greater risks of censorship
and discriminatory application" 284 than do content-neutral ordi-
nances, refused to apply the intermediate standard.285 Surprisingly, it
also declined to apply the strict standard.2 86 Instead, the Court in-
vented and applied a sort of "intermediate-intermediate" scrutiny
standard,287 one somewhere between intermediate and strict-
namely, that the restriction must "burden no more speech than neces-
sary to serve a significant government interest."28 8 It then used that
standard to uphold the restriction prohibiting the anti-abortion
protesters from demonstrating within thirty-six feet of clinic prop-
erty289 and the noise restriction.290
283 Id.
284 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764.
285 See id. at 765 ("We believe that [the differences between a content-neutral ordi-
nance and an injunction] require a somewhat more stringent application of general
First Amendment principles .... ").
286 See id. at 762-64. While admitting that the injunction regulated only the
speech of anti-abortion protesters, the Court argued that to find strict scrutiny appli-
cable on that basis alone "would be to classify virtually every injunction as content or
viewpoint based." Id. The Court reasoned that such a classification was not necessary;
ignoring the reality that the issued injunction discriminatorily restricted only the
speech of those opposed to abortion, the Court surmised that "[tihere is no sugges-
tion ... that Florida law would not equally restrain similar conduct directed at a target
having nothing to do with abortion," and on that basis concluded that "none of the
restrictions imposed by the court were directed at the contents of petitioner's
message." Id. In dissent, however, Justice Scalia observed,
The real question in this case is not whether intermediate scru-
tiny.., should be supplemented because of the distinctive characteristics of
injunctions; but rather whether those distinctive characteristics are not, for
reasons of both policy and precedent, fully as good a reason as "content
basis" for demanding strict scrutiny ... [T]he central element of the an-
swer is that a restriction upon speech imposed by injunction (whether nomi-
nally content based or nominally content neutral) is at least as deserving of
strict scrutiny as a statutory, content-based restriction.
Id. at 792-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 792-97
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining why injunctions are deserving of strict scrutiny).
287 See id. at 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 765.
289 See id- at 769-70 (citing the need to protect unhampered ingress and egress to
and from the clinic).
290 See id. at 772 (deeming the restriction necessary to ensure the health and well-
being of the patients at the clinic).
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Such general restrictions ignore the "precision of regulation" de-
manded by Claiborne Hardware. They restrict all speech in a given area
(in the case of the thirty-six-foot restriction) or of a given kind during
given hours (in the case of the noise restriction), rather than teasing
out and prohibiting only the unprotected speech within those classifi-
cations. Thus, after Madsen, it is uncertain whether the constitutional
rights of protesters would be fully protected in a RICO/Hobbs Act
case, even at the Supreme Court.291 This uncertainty is exacerbated
by the fact that the application of RICO in the context of social and
political protest is coming to be seen as an abortion issue-which, due
to apparent judicial hostility to anti-abortion protesters, seems to have
led to a suspension of standard First Amendment jurisprudence in
this area.
2 92
291 See Golinski, supra note 17, at 196. Golinski observed,
In Madsen, the Supreme Court compromised the rights of free speech to an
extreme degree, allowing some aspects of peaceful protest to be enjoined.
The majority, in essence, found freedom of speech interests inferior to
rights associated with clinic access, protecting the speech of protesters only
when enjoining the speech was not necessary to further the state's interest.
Under Madsen, it is unlikely that a First Amendment defense to a RICO stat-
ute can provide a complete buffer against the destructive RICO remedies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
292 Madsen, although disturbing, is not the only example of a federal court abro-
gating First Amendment rights in the context of abortion protest. In fact, the First
Amendment rights nullified in Madsen seem trivial when compared with those as-
sailed in a recent case. See Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activ-
ists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment). Space prohibits a full analysis of the broad implications of this decision
for First Amendment freedoms, but even a cursory examination of the issues gives
cause for alarm.
American Coalition extended RICO liability to "extortionate" speech activities
committed outside the victims' presence via various media. In that case, several indi-
vidual doctors and two clinics brought suit against two anti-abortion protest organiza-
tions and various individuals who were "actively involved" in their activities. Id. at
1185. The plaintiffs alleged that certain "speech" made by the defendants constituted
"true threats" for which those threatened were entitled to damages. Id at 1186. The
attacked "speech" included, inter alia: (1) a poster entitled "THE DEADLY DOZEN,"
(2) a poster of plaintiff Crist, and (3) an internet site called the "Nuremberg Files,"
the stated purpose of which was to "collect[] dossiers on abortionists in anticipation
that one day we may be able to hold them on trial for crimes against humanity"-the
site listed over 200 people labeled as "ABORTIONISTS" and over 200 others includ-
ing clinic workers, judges, politicians, law enforcement, and "MISCELLANEOUS
BLOOD FLUNKIES." Id. at 1186-88. In three areas the site bore drawings of what
appear to be lines of dripping blood; a line was drawn through the name of each
person who had been killed by anti-abortion protesters (the web site is described in
Rene Sanchez, Abortion Foes' Internet Site on Tria, WASH. PosT, Jan. 15, 1999, at A3).
The plaintiffs, putting this speech in the "context of violence" reaching back to the
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March 1993 shooting of Dr. David Gunn, testified that they felt "threatened"-
although they conceded, and the court instructed, that the materials did not consti-
tute an "incitement to violence." Id. at 1186. Instead, the judge decided that "the
viability of... plaintiffs' claims depends on whether the defendants' statements con-
stitute [First Amendment] protected speech or unprotected 'true threats' . . . [as]
'true threats' are not protected under the First Amendment." American Coalition, 23 F.
Supp. 2d at 1188-89 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)). The
court adopted the Ninth Circuit's objective, speaker-based test for the existence of a
"true threat," namely, "whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault." Id. at 1189 (citing United States v.
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also id. (holding that
"[a] lleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, includ-
ing the surrounding events and [the] reaction of the listeners") (alterations in origi-
nal). The court then examined the "context of violence" asserted by the plaintiffs
and found all three instances of speech could be found to constitute "true threats"
unprotected by the First Amendment in a trial on the merits. 1d. at 1194.
Clearly, a finding that this speech might not be protected by the First Amend-
ment rests uneasily in the context of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. First, the
plaintiffs could have avoided this speech by simply not looking at it. Cf Madsen, 512
U.S at 773 (noting that visual speech is different from verbal speech, in that "it is
much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears,
and no more is required to avoid seeing placards through the windows of the clinic").
Moreover speech, absent conduct, traditionally cannot be circumscribed except
where it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (re-
versing the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member); see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772
("[T]hreats ... are proscribable[, and so are] 'fighting words' [-speech] so infused
with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm .... [C]itizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to [First Amendment] freedoms." (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 322 (1988)); Watts, 394 U.S. at 706, 708 (finding an anti-Vietnam war demonstra-
tor's statement, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my
sights is L.BJ." to constitute not a "threat," but only "political hyperbole"); Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); ef. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (rejecting the claims that any unlawful threats were made against
those who were intimidated by speeches of an NAACP leader in support of a boycott
which did not incite violence or specifically authorize it and stating that "Speech does
not lose its protected character... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce
them into action").
Nevertheless, at trial the defendants were found liable under RICO with Hobbs
Act predicates-probably at least in part because the instructions of the court were
drafted without proper regard to the teachings of Claiborne Hardware and Brandenburg.
See generally Jury Instructions, American Coalition (No. 95-1671-JO); see also Verdict,
American Coalition (No. 95-1671-JO) (assessing liability without the "precision of regu-
lation" demanded by Claiborne Hardware). The jury awarded the plaintiffs $107 mil-
lion. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Creators ofAnti-Abortion Web Site Told to Pay Millions, N.Y.
TudEs, Feb. 3, 1999, atA9. The court also issued a permanent injunction that prohib-
its the defendants from, inter alia,
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VII. PROTECTING FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS FROM THE RICO/
HOBBS ACT WEAPON
Congress designed RICO as a powerful tool for fighting enter-
prise criminality. It intended that RICO not apply to social or political
protest. Congress carefully and narrowly chose RICO's predicate of-
fenses so that RICO could not reach protest activity, even when that
activity strays just outside the lines of First Amendment protection.
Sadly, judicial intervention thwarted Congress's intent by expanding
the definition of Hobbs Act extortion from its common law roots,
equating "extortion" with "coercion." While only one Circuit has
squarely addressed the "obtaining" requirement of extortion in the
context of political protest, the fact that others have glossed over the
issue has proved just as damaging for protesters facing the threat of
RICO litigation. This makes RICO a dangerous weapon-in fact, a
bludgeon of First Amendment freedoms. The chilling effect on pro-
test caused by amenability to suit under RICO, with the litigation costs
involved in mounting a RICO defense (not to mention the prospect of
being found liable for treble damages and opponents' attorney fees),
cannot be denied. Moreover, courts are largely ignoring the man-
dates of First Amendment jurisprudence in their application of RICO
and expanded Hobbs Act extortion to reach social or political protest
activities. By so doing, they effectively eviscerate the First Amendment
and chill political protest.
(b) Publishing, republishing, reproducing and/or distributing anywhere,
either directly or indirectly, the "Deadly Dozen" Poster... or its equivalent,
with specific intent to threaten [the plaintiffs] or any of their family mem-
bers, officers, agents, servants, employees, patients, or attorneys; (c) Publish-
ing, republishing, reproducing and/or distributing anywhere, either directly
or indirectly, the Poster of Dr. Robert Crist... or its equivalent, with specific
intent to threaten [the plaintiffs] or any of their family members, officers,
agents, servants, employees, patients or attorneys; [and], (d) Providing addi-
tional material concerning [the plaintiffs] or any of their family members,
officers, agents, servants, employees, patients, or attorneys, with a specific
intent to threaten, to the Nuremberg Files or any mirror web site that may
be created. In addition, defendants are enjoined from publishing, repub-
lishing, reproducing and/or distributing in print or electronic form the per-
sonally identifying information about plaintiffs contained in [the
Nuremberg Files] with a specific intent to threaten.
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130,
1155-56 (D. Or. 1999) (footnote omitted).
That this kind of speech-passive entities such as posters and computer web-
sites-so far removed from an actual incitement to imminent violence, can constitute
a "true threat," and thus be actionable while the First Amendment nominally lives is,
to put it mildly, unsettling.
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To make matters worse, the federal courts-including the
Supreme Court-seem to have lost sight of the importance of this is-
sue, viewing it as an abortion matter rather than an issue involving
constitutionally protected freedom of political protest. The recent at-
tempt to apply the RICO/Hobbs Act weapon to other kinds of social
and political protesters, however, underscores the ubiquitous nature
of this problem.
Despite the swirling miasma of RICO and First Amendment
problems generated by the current expanded definition of extortion,
the Supreme Court has not, in recent times, been of a mind to clarify
the scope of extortion 293 or to clarify how the First Amendment ap-
plies to RICO and Hobbs Act use in the social or political protest con-
text.294 However, if Americans are to continue to enjoy the
constitutional freedom to protest that was so dear to this nation's
founders, action must be taken swiftly to vindicate those freedoms.
Guidance from more focused panel clarifications or en banc rehear-
ings by the circuit courts, or a Supreme Court decision, is urgently
needed. Alternatively, resort to Congressional action is possible. 295 In
any event, judicial or legislative action is required to
(1) retrench the judicially expanded definition of "extortion,"
clarifying that extortionate "obtaining" requires both a "get-
ting" and a "deprivation" of tangible or intangible property;
(2) ensure that "precision of regulation" is used in litigation in-
volving First Amendment freedoms to distinguish protected
from unprotected activity and in assessing individual and
group liability; and
(3) clarify the concept of "threat."
293 NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 n.2 (1994).
294 See id. at 262 n.6.
295 Congress is, of course, free-consistent with Due Process-to modify statuto-
rily created rights imposing liability, even after conduct in violation of that standard
has occurred. This is particularly the case where the legislation is curative ofjudicial
interpretation of congressional intent. See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169
F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1948) (upholding the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which cur-
tailed the scope of liability unexpectedly imposed under the Fair Labor Standards Act
in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), and collecting Supreme
Court decisions); accord Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 10-12 (1st Cir. 1986)
(collecting Supreme Court decisions). Numerous cases uphold such legislation.
Last year, Republican Senator Dan Coats (Ind.) introduced a bill designed to
address points (1) and (2) below. See 144 CONG. REc. 12,179 (daily ed., Oct. 9, 1998).
While that bill was not enacted, its introduction indicates that at least Congress is
becoming aware of the problem. In the absence of (or in addition to) swift circuit or
Supreme Court action in this area, point (3) should be added to the bill, and it
should be re-introduced and processed without delay.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The illegitimate expansion of Hobbs Act extortion and the for-
getting of First Amendment jurisprudence are allowing RICO to be
used against social and political protesters-into the teeth of specific
Congressional intent. The missteps of the past must be corrected, and
the time for action is now. At the very least Claibome Hardware must
be rediscovered. More properly, Hobbs Act "extortion" must be dis-
gorged from "coercion," and the concept of "threat" must be clarified.
RICO must not be allowed to chill the First Amendment.
